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Executive summary
Agriculture plays numerous roles in society. The 
most obvious is to produce food (and, to a lesser 
extent, fibre). While agriculture is the mainstay 
of the rural economy, it also shapes social 
relations and landscapes. In some countries, this 
is taken as an unmitigated positive. However, 
in South Africa, agriculture is built on the back 
of dispossession of the African population 
and their social, economic and political 
marginalisation. It is built on extractive methods 
that deplete the soil, the water and the natural 
vegetation. Agricultural policy in post-apartheid 
South Africa must grasp these contradictions, 
simultaneously strengthening the positive 
features of agriculture and abolishing those that 
rely on the immiseration of human beings and 
the destruction of the environment.
Agriculture was not high on the list of priorities 
for the post-apartheid government. It was one 
of the sectors that experienced deep cuts in the 
budget following the demise of apartheid. Only 
from around 2003 did the budget start climbing 
again, but the 2011 budget estimates are still be-
low those of the 1980s in real terms. Provincial 
budgets are stagnating.
Land reform, agricultural 
support and rural 
development
Land reform was given greater political prior-
ity than agriculture, but this was more symbolic 
than real. Two major challenges face the land 
reform programme at present. The first is to 
speed up the transfer of land. The second is to 
support productive use of transferred land. The 
programme has fallen far short of its delivery 
targets. The reasons for the slow pace of land 
reform are contentious. Some argue that land 
prices are inflated and the market-based policy 
requires the government to pay these prices. 
Others point to bureaucracy and institutional in-
capacity in the government. There is a case to be 
made for both points of view.
Taking inflation, rising land prices and the need 
to build internal capacity in the government into 
account, it is certain that insufficient resources 
are being directed towards the land reform pro-
gramme for the target of transferring 30% of 
white-owned agricultural land to black farmers 
by 2014 to be met. Consequently, achievement 
of the target has been deferred until 2025, in 
which case greater costs will be incurred. While 
scrapping the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ policy 
might reduce prices somewhat, there will be a 
secular upward trend in land prices. On the oth-
er hand, the Department of Rural Development 
and Land Reform (DRDLR) is not spending what 
it has for land purchase, and the Treasury has 
directed unused money away from the land re-
form programme towards the new rural develop-
ment functions of the department. Overall, the 
programme is hampered by very weak delivery 
systems and institutions, inadequate budgets, 
top-down implementation (with expectations of 
a passive citizenry) and extremely poor provision 
of agricultural support.
While production support has shifted notably 
from white to black and, to some extent, 
from large-scale to smaller-scale agriculture, 
the level of support was negligible until 2003, 
which saw the launch of the Comprehensive 
Agricultural Support Programme (CASP). 
Farmer support constitutes the biggest sub-
programme at provincial level in all provinces 
except for Gauteng and the North West. CASP 
is designed to assist black farmers to participate 
in a market dominated by established white 
producers and agribusinesses, but not to alter 
the logic of the market or production system, 
based as they are on the private appropriation 
of surpluses. Although most provincial farmer 
support programmes have expanded in real 
terms since 2007, implementation is patchy, 
with lack of capacity at provincial level blamed 
for an inability to use available resources. Lack 
of capacity is just another way of saying that 
there are insufficient people possessing the 
skills appropriate to requirements. Despite 
rhetoric about indigenous knowledge and food 
security, the government has not attempted to 
build an alternative seed production capability. 
Concentrated private power in the seed and 
agrochemicals supply sectors is not challenged by 
government policy. There has been no attempt 
by the government to intervene in the structures 
of these sub-sectors, despite sharp price rises for 
agrochemicals and increasingly concentrated 
ownership of commercial seed production and 
distribution.
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The National Water Act forms the basis for cur-
rent water policy with regard to agriculture. In 
essence, the Act separated ownership of land 
from ownership of water (riparian rights) and 
vested the latter in the state. This was a radical 
shift, but was accompanied by agreement that 
previous patterns of use could remain, within 
a system of registration of these uses. There is 
recognition at the highest levels that the link 
between land reform, agricultural support and 
water resource provision is weak. There are two 
approaches to dealing with this: investing in ir-
rigation, both for commercial and for resource-
poor farmers, and linking water provision to the 
land transfer process. A significant emphasis of 
irrigation planning is on rehabilitating or con-
structing large-scale schemes. There is also some 
activity around the revitalisation of small-scale 
irrigation schemes, mainly in the former home-
land areas. There are some small-scale efforts to 
deal with the effects of climate change, includ-
ing water harvesting and adapting types of pro-
duction to more drought-tolerant crops. These 
efforts, however, do not match the scale of the 
challenge facing agricultural producers, espe-
cially those in drier areas with limited resources 
of their own.
Until recently, plans and activities to support the 
productive use of land once it has been trans-
ferred were fragmented between land reform 
and agriculture. The government’s two main 
programmes are the Land Redistribution for Ag-
ricultural Development (LRAD) programme in 
land reform, and CASP in agricultural support. 
These have operated as separate programmes 
for most of their existence. In 2008, the Land 
and Agrarian Reform Programme (LARP) was 
established between the national departments 
of agriculture and land affairs and the provincial 
departments of agriculture, essentially to inte-
grate LRAD and CASP. Implementation has been 
slow and there is little evidence of any signifi-
cant change in practice to date.
The Comprehensive Rural Development Pro-
gramme (CRDP) is the latest manifestation of 
government attempts to integrate agricultural 
support, land reform and broader rural develop-
ment without actually putting more money into 
rural areas. Early indications are that the pro-
gramme is likely to run into difficulties. It relies 
on the already weak institutions of the former 
Department of Land Affairs (now renamed, with 
a bigger mandate but without a substantially 
bigger budget). The approach to planning and 
implementation is rushed, signifying a continua-
tion of the ‘immediate delivery at all costs’ men-
tality so prevalent in government, which leads 
to poor quality and lack of sustainability. In ad-
dition, people remain bystanders in their own 
development, except for the select few who will 
be chosen to sit on advisory groups with poorly 
defined purposes. Policy-making structures re-
main dominated by agribusiness, which is able 
to wield a strong influence on the direction of 
government support to both land reform and 
agriculture.
Farm workers and dwellers
In the agricultural restructuring that continued 
through the political transition in South Africa, 
the paternalist power structure on farms was 
partially replaced by a regulatory regime that es-
tablished a formal labour relations framework, 
which sought to modernise labour relations on 
commercial farms. The new regulatory regime 
facilitated processes involving large-scale job 
losses, evictions and the rise of casualisation and 
labour broking, as farms reoriented to global 
competition. The extension of labour and ten-
ure security legislation to farm workers has not 
encouraged the ‘internalisation’ of the costs of 
labour in farm enterprises, and these continue 
to be borne by workers and their families in the 
form of low wages and tenure and job insecu-
rity.
Finance, research and 
development, training and 
extension
Deregulation has established the basic expecta-
tion that farmers – regardless of what resources 
they have, or their size – should be able to raise 
both capital and production loans at market-
related interest rates, and be able to pay them 
back. The restructuring of the Land Bank result-
ed in commercial banks becoming the primary 
lenders to commercial agriculture. There are two 
fundamental challenges with this in South Africa 
at present: lack of access to credit for resource-
poor farmers; and inability to pay back loans. The 
government has tried to improve access to credit 
by retaining or creating new government insti-
tutions to provide credit, and by encouraging 
the private sector to extend loans to resource-
poor or black farmers. The failure of the Land 
Bank has resulted in first the Treasury and then 
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the DRDLR taking over its loan book. In recent 
times, there have been suggestions that the 
government must intervene more proactively in 
the provision of credit to farmers. Overall gov-
ernment financial support for emerging farmers 
has been very poor. The Mafisa programme was 
launched in 2006 to provide micro and retail ag-
ricultural financial services, and to facilitate ac-
cess to public-sector programmes. The govern-
ment’s response to the inability of farmers to 
repay loans correctly emphasises the need for 
proper support and mentorship to enable farm-
ers to become financially self-sufficient. A model 
is being proposed whereby government-owned 
farms are leased to new entrants for a time to 
identify who will ultimately receive farms. The 
theory is that the government will provide ad-
equate production support during this time. So 
far, the model is at the planning and conceptu-
alisation stage.
South Africa’s National Agricultural Research 
System (NARS) is based on parastatals and sci-
ence councils, higher education and develop-
ment institutions, and the private sector. The 
main flaws in the NARS are weak co-ordination 
and linkages, and limited resources and capac-
ity, a familiar refrain in the agricultural sector. 
The government’s strategic plan for 2009–2014 
indicates that dedicated resources will be put 
aside to recapitalise agricultural training colleg-
es. Low student numbers at agricultural colleges 
have meant a shift from the training of exten-
sion officers to the training of farmers directly. 
The Agricultural Sector Education and Training 
Authority (AgriSETA) was established to provide 
work-based, functional training in agriculture. 
The AgriSETA is flooded with requests for train-
ing assistance, not only from farm workers but 
also from land reform beneficiaries who have 
nowhere else to turn. In 2006/07, the SETA re-
ceived 16 245 applications for learnerships, of 
which just 400 were approved, and 59 000 appli-
cations for skills programmes, of which just 475 
were approved.
South Africa’s public extension service has been 
in gradual decline over the past 15 to 20 years, 
as the resources of the Department of Agricul-
ture, Forestry and Fisheries (DAFF) have shrunk 
and extension services for commercial farmers 
have been privatised. In 2008, there were 2 152 
agricultural extension officers in South Africa. 
Almost 60% of these were in the Eastern Cape 
and Limpopo. Staff numbers dropped fairly 
rapidly between 2006 and 2009, and then rose 
slightly with the expectation that they would re-
main static in the medium term (until 2012). The 
ratio of extension officers to farmers is 1:878, 
which is comparable with other countries with 
similar agricultural issues, such as India, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe. DAFF’s Extension Recovery Plan 
has the aim of reviving public extension services 
by increasing numbers and reskilling, although 
this is not planned for or budgeted in all pro-
vincial departments. A key issue is what value 
is attached to providing appropriate extension 
services to resource-poor farmers. Consideration 
of the potential role of community-based exten-
sion workers as auxiliaries located in the commu-
nities can be considered as a cost-effective way 
of producing an accountable service.
Value-adding and markets
Liberalisation and deregulation removed the 
state from direct interventions in almost all 
downstream activities in South Africa. Concen-
tration in food manufacturing, storage and 
retailing has grown significantly under the de-
regulated environment. For smallholders, phas-
ing out controls and closing marketing boards 
led to a shortage of essential services formerly 
provided by the boards and co-operatives. The 
ANC’s 2007 Polokwane conference resolutions 
recognise that concentration and vertical in-
tegration in the value chain limit the space for 
smallholders to participate in the market. The 
ANC proposes ‘to integrate smallholders into 
formal value chains and link them with markets’. 
Co-operatives are identified as a key organisa-
tional form to realise this. However, the resolu-
tions are neutral about the extent to which the 
co-ops might be oriented to transforming the in-
herited market economy, as opposed to merely 
enabling access to it. That means looking for op-
portunities for decommodification and building 
alternative channels for distribution that can be 
part of constructing a ‘solidarity economy’.
There is some state sponsorship of large-scale 
processing, where this is seen as potentially stra-
tegic, but limited support exists for small-scale, 
localised storage and processing facilities. A pos-
sible long-term development is the increasing 
regionalisation of the agricultural value chain, 
with other central and southern African coun-
tries producing agricultural commodities, and 
South Africa – with its stronger manufacturing 
base – increasingly processing these commodi-
ties for the region.
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Trade policy has shifted fundamentally since the 
days of apartheid. The post-apartheid model is 
of a small, open economy that trades as freely as 
possible with the rest of the world. South Africa 
reduced tariffs far quicker than was required by 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) obligations, 
showing the government’s favour of open 
markets for most commodities and products. 
Export producers have benefited from trade 
policy, with agricultural exports growing 350% 
between 1995 and 2007. Nevertheless, there 
has been a simultaneous growth in the cost of 
imports, as the rand has devalued over the years. 
These include an increase in the cost of covering 
shortfalls in basic food items, such as wheat 
and red meat, which are valued in dollar terms, 
and rising input costs for commodities such as 
machinery and plant and seed patents. South 
African food imports have risen substantially 
since trade liberalisation. A generalised policy 
of import parity pricing has meant that global 
commodity prices dictate what local producers 
receive for their produce, regardless of the 
actual cost of production. The global economic 
crisis and responses from governments around 
the world suggest that some tariff flexibility is 
appropriate. The Deputy Minister of Trade and 
Industry recently suggested the possibility of 
raising tariffs to protect the economy during the 
crisis.
Multifunctionality: food 
security, productivism and 
ecological modernisation
A major purpose of agriculture is to produce 
food. South Africa has shifted from a policy of 
food self-sufficiency to a policy of trade in food 
based on comparative advantage. In South Af-
rica, food insecurity is mainly a problem of distri-
bution and access. The government has tried to 
respond to this by emphasising social protection 
in the form of social grants and (on a far smaller 
scale) food parcels. These are important inter-
ventions, although they do leave the existing 
social and economic system of producing food 
intact.
A transformative agenda might focus more on 
food sovereignty, which places greater emphasis 
on how and by whom food is produced in the 
first place. Amartya Sen argues that in times of 
sharp prices rises or fluctuations (as at present), 
the ability to produce food can be more impor-
tant than having money to buy food. Govern-
ment programmes supporting the production 
of food gardens are expanding, although these 
tend to be welfarist in orientation and are dis-
connected from broader processes of transfer-
ring land and identifying and building a new 
layer of producers to generate food surpluses.
The key elements of the concept of food sov-
ereignty are: the priority of local agricultural 
production to feed people locally; the right of 
countries to protect themselves from the dump-
ing of underpriced agricultural produce; the 
need for agricultural prices to be directly linked 
to production costs; and the mainstreaming of 
agro-ecological production that recognises food 
production, sustainable livelihoods, living land-
scapes and environmental integrity as integral 
to rural sustainability. This connects closely with 
a radical conception of the multifunctionality of 
agriculture, which understands agriculture to 
have many beneficial purposes, of which food 
production is but one.
The multifunctionality of agriculture is a highly 
contested concept and is not accepted by all 
parties. The dominant way of thinking about 
agriculture in South Africa, and globally, is on 
the basis of productivism, which privileges the 
commodity-producing aspects of agriculture, 
and seeks to target policy at increasing produc-
tivity. Some parties aim to increase productivity 
at all costs, downplaying the negative social and 
ecological externalities generated by agricul-
ture and, at best, seeking to offset them. Others 
aim to develop ‘modernised’ systems that can 
internalise these costs, while retaining the core 
commodity-producing character of agriculture. 
Other approaches concentrate more on the role 
of the state in supporting agricultural productiv-
ity. Whether social democratic or neo-liberal, all 
of these approaches have in common an essen-
tially productivist vision. Radical multifunction-
ality and food sovereignty attempt to break this 
down, and to replace it with a more needs-based 
and solidaristic approach to food production 
and distribution.
The discourse of sustainable resource use is cap-
tured in a similar frame. There is a degree of con-
sensus that sustainability can be taken to refer 
not only to economic sustainability, but to social 
and ecological sustainability too. However, in 
dominant conceptions, economic sustainability 
is wedded to the production of profit. Conserva-
tion and ecological sustainability have become 
part of the mainstream discourse in recognition 
that ultimately ecological damage will have 
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negative economic effects at a large enough 
scale for governments and corporations to take 
notice (i.e. it can potentially hurt their own in-
terests). This leads to an ‘ecological modernisa-
tion’ approach that seeks to retrofit capitalism 
with ecological safeguards without fundamen-
tally changing the logic of a system that is based 
on private appropriation of surpluses generated 
through the exploitation of human labour and 
natural resources. Sustainability in South Africa 
is geared towards a corporatist model, in terms 
of which the state and business interests align 
their long-term strategies. Non-profit, practical 
interventions to secure natural resources, such as 
preventative measures during planning and the 
LandCare programme, are very minor. 
Reflections on the 
developmental state, black 
economic empowerment and 
agriculture
One of the major contemporary debates in South 
Africa is to what extent the state should be 
directly involved in economic activity. Currently, 
the debate is viewed mainly through the prism 
of the ‘developmental state’. There is certainly 
no agreement on what this means: it has been 
used both to justify crony capitalism and to 
represent the type of state that can prepare 
the ground for socialism. There are two key 
views at the core of the developmental state: 
a) the market does not work well in promoting 
industrialisation, especially in a global economy 
where some states already have mature industrial 
sectors – therefore, it is appropriate for the state 
to intervene to distort market incentives to 
selectively build up industries that can become 
competitive; and b) the state needs to have the 
autonomy to implement the ‘right’ policies in 
the face of both vested interests and ‘populist’ 
pressure from the general population.
Reaction to the highly interventionist apartheid 
state, both from white monopoly capital and 
the excluded black majority (albeit for different 
reasons), provided the seeds for a counter-
hegemonic thrust, under the leadership of a 
nascent black middle class, that forged important 
fractions of these forces into a post-apartheid 
historic bloc. After the fall of apartheid, the new 
hegemonic group recognised the importance of 
an interventionist state based on racial inclusivity. 
There was a simultaneous recognition that the 
state was the only real tool they had to drive their 
own accumulation interests. Lack of specificity in 
defining the developmental state created room 
for a section of the ANC leadership to assert that 
building a black economic elite was a step on the 
road to social and economic improvement for all. 
This political trajectory inflected discourse and 
practice on the developmental role of the state. 
Development was taken to mean building a 
black capitalist class that could deepen capitalist 
relations and forces of production.
In agriculture, this manifested in the production 
of the AgriBEE Charter and in the use of 
parastatals as tools for accumulation and 
building up the class base of the hegemonic 
group. The Charter is undoubtedly situated 
within a capitalist framework that seeks to 
change ownership along the value chain (which is 
important), but does not challenge the structure 
of the private accumulation purpose of that 
chain. Agricultural corporations and agencies 
were restructured or recreated to operate more 
as commercially oriented financing and business-
support institutions than as agencies to channel 
public resources into implementing government 
plans for the benefit of many. They have 
accommodated to the market and have proven 
to be institutional bases for the building of a 
narrow capitalist clique that does not generate 
its wealth through its own productive activity.
Conclusion: pursuing a 
smallholder strategy
There are an estimated 240 000 black farmers 
with a commercial focus, and between 2 mil-
lion and 4 million farmers who produce food 
mainly to meet their own household consump-
tion needs. These groups form the natural base 
for a smallholder strategy. During the transition 
to democracy, there was some policy debate on 
the relative merits and demerits of pursuing a 
smallholder strategy. There was general agree-
ment amongst insiders that it was necessary to 
continue with the policy reforms started under 
apartheid to wean commercial agriculture off 
state support, and for markets to drive the sector 
in future. The architects of the policy succeeded 
in convincing the political leadership that the 
restructuring of commercial agriculture would 
be able to accommodate black farmers using the 
market as a key mechanism for the provision of 
services and infrastructure. However, because of 
lack of resources and will, the smallholder com-
ponent of the resulting strategy was not imple-
mented in any meaningful way.
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Rhetorically, a renewed emphasis has been 
placed on a smallholder strategy following the 
ANC’s National Conference in Polokwane in 
2007. However, there is insufficient financial sup-
port to the agricultural sector as a whole, which 
means that agricultural plans cannot be carried 
out. The response of the national government, 
at a time of economic contraction, has been to 
reallocate resources from agriculture to other 
priority areas of the economy. Whether this 
is the correct decision or not, it indicates that, 
despite the rhetoric of rural development that 
accompanied the Zuma administration’s rise to 
power, when it comes to the crunch, agriculture 
and rural development are not really seen as 
potential drivers of the economy. We remain in 
the broad mindset that agriculture is a declin-
ing sector compared to the whole economy, and 
that the future is urban. If additional resources 
are to come into the sector, it is imperative that 
emphasis is placed on building the capacity of 
provincial departments to deliver, with more 
skilled, and decentralised, staff being the pri-
mary concern.
Shifting from a racially exclusive agricultural 
system to a more racially inclusive one will take 
time. Patience is required. If we look at the 
history of the establishment of white commercial 
agriculture in South Africa, the pace was 
extremely slow, and significant, ongoing state 
support was essential. South Africa is now in the 
initial stages of building a black farming class, 
and many lessons can be drawn from the way the 
state supported farmers in the past. However, 
the intention should be to go a step further than 
merely reproducing the commercial agricultural 
model on a wider basis. The challenge is to think 
about which of the state-sponsored institutions 
and interventions of the past can contribute to 
building a more equitable agricultural model in 
the present, which does not rely (as historical 
models did) on dispossession, super-exploitation 
of the workforce, and ecological damage.
A strategy that seeks to insert smallholders into 
the large-scale, industrial, export-oriented model 
can only succeed in broadening and diversifying 
the producer base slightly. The large-scale model 
also brings with it the deepening problems of 
concentration in the value chain, which, in turn, 
entrench the production model. The ANC in 
government has identified the major contours 
of the challenge, but its responses tend towards 
seeking to deracialise that model while keeping 
its core intact. An alternative has to confront 
the existing economic power of commercial 
agriculture and agro-industry with the aim of 
transforming it in the interests of the poor. 
Deracialisation is necessary, but is not sufficient 
to realise this. The logic of a smallholder strategy 
must be followed beyond the farm gate, to the 
institutions that support agriculture and the 
value chains that feed off it.
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1 Introduction
Agriculture plays numerous roles in society. The 
most obvious is to produce food (and, to a lesser 
extent, fibre). While agriculture is the mainstay 
of the rural economy, it also shapes social rela-
tions and landscapes. In some countries, this is 
taken as an unmitigated positive. However, in 
South Africa, agriculture is built on the back 
of dispossession of the African population, and 
their social, economic and political marginalisa-
tion. It is built on extractive methods that de-
plete the soil, the water and the natural vegeta-
tion. Agricultural policy in post-apartheid South 
Africa must grasp these contradictions, simulta-
neously strengthening the positive features of 
agriculture while abolishing those that rely on 
the immiseration of human beings and the de-
struction of the environment for its survival.
Recent political developments have opened 
the space to reconsider approaches to land and 
agriculture in South Africa. As a result of com-
promises made in political negotiations, land 
reform and agriculture have followed a path 
that generally has suited large-scale commercial 
agriculture and agribusiness, with a few neces-
sary compromises along the way (e.g. having any 
land reform programme at all). The process has 
been controlled tightly from the top, and mar-
kets in both land and agriculture have reigned 
supreme. These are not really under threat in 
the current conjuncture, although there is a 
willingness to question how well the present ar-
rangement is working in meeting national goals, 
which arguably have more to do with economic 
and social stability than with redistribution and 
transformation.
Systematic support for smallholder agriculture 
has resurfaced on the agenda after being dis-
cussed and essentially shelved in the early-to-
mid-1990s. This opens the space for contestation. 
The dominant model of smallholder agriculture 
concentrates on efficiency of production and 
integration into national and global circuits of 
capital, but the debate allows for alternative vi-
sions of smallholder agriculture to emerge. These 
are oriented towards the grassroots, rather than 
towards concentrated economic and political 
power. They identify the potential for small-
holder agriculture to transform the structure of 
landownership and production in South Africa, 
while simultaneously securing food production 
and brining access to food and economic activity 
closer to direct, grassroots control.
The structural factors underpinning the current 
global economic crisis will not go away when the 
short-term ‘green shoots of recovery’ finally ar-
rive. These factors include: deepening immisera-
tion of the world’s poor; skyrocketing food and 
resource prices caused by market manipulation 
and growing resource scarcity; ecological dam-
age that threatens the existence of the human 
species; and a crisis of political representation, 
where private economic agents dominate over 
the public interest. Regardless of the short-term 
fortunes of the global economy, these factors 
are set to deepen the increasingly apparent con-
tradictions in the global economic and political 
system. An approach to smallholder agriculture 
that can be sustained beyond crises will need to 
respond to these structural factors in its design 
and implementation.1
Box: What is smallholder agriculture?
The terms of the South African debate on smallholder agriculture are not always clear. Often, 
smallholder agriculture is used interchangeably with subsistence agriculture and, therefore, 
is associated with plots of 1 hectare or less. There was some discussion on smallholders with 
larger pieces of land in areas with high agricultural potential, especially fruit, sugar and, to a 
lesser extent, cotton, mainly in contract farming schemes. The ANC produced an agricultural 
policy document in 1994 that emphasised smallholder agriculture, but contained very little re-
flection on where it would emerge from or how it would be built. Supporters of a smallholder 
strategy, which included the World Bank (1993), did not necessarily agree on what it might 
look like either. The idea of small farmers who are intensely competitive, export-oriented and 
driven by profit maximisation is far from the idea of small farmers who practice ecological and 
low-external-input agriculture, who produce primarily for local use and who operate largely 
outside the market. While there are certain similarities between the positions, there are also 
fundamental differences, which relate, in turn, to the debates about multifunctionality and 
food sovereignty.
1 Thanks to Michael Aliber, Ben 
Cousins, Karin Kleinbooi and 
Ruth Hall – all from PLAAS – 
for sharing information and 
insights.
22 Trends in budgets and 
expenditure
When all is said and done, the ultimate meas-
ure of political priority is where the government 
channels public resources. From this point of 
view, agriculture is not a high priority in South 
Africa. Although the budget has started to rise 
in recent years, this follows an extreme drop in 
the 1990s, and, in real terms, the budget remains 
lower than it was in the late 1980s, towards the 
end of apartheid. Figure 1 shows the tail end of 
this process. At the same time, the current de-
partment has to take into consideration a far 
greater number of farmers than did the racially 
exclusive apartheid government. Consequently, 
there is less money to do more work. Not only 
is agriculture receiving less money than it did 
in the past, but its share as a percentage of the 
overall national budget has declined and vacil-
lates between approximately 0.33% and 0.50% 
of the national budget. Provincial budgets must 
be added to this. In 2009/10, the cumulative total 
of provincial budgets for agriculture (including 
conservation and environment in four provinces 
– KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, North West and 
Gauteng) came to R7.55 billion. If we combine 
this with the national department’s budget, it 
comes to a total of R10.35 billion, or just 1.6% of 
the national budget. Figure 2 shows a gradual 
increase in provincial agricultural budgets in real 
terms since 2004/05, but reaching a plateau in 
2008/09. The plateau occurred at the same time 
as an apparent policy shift towards rural devel-
opment, and begs the question of how the ad-
ditional work will be resourced.
Figure 1: National agricultural budgets, 1996–2011 
(adjusted for inflation, 2009 rands)
Source: National Treasury (various years) National budget: Estimates of national expenditure 
Note: *2010/11 and 2011/12 are based on the assumption of 7% CPI growth per annum
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In the lean period of the 1990s, the state retained 
only those functions that individual producers 
were unable or unwilling to exercise on their 
own, and which lie at the margins of production 
but are indispensable for the continued 
existence of the sector (Aglietta 1986) – statistics, 
some research and development (R&D), trade 
negotiations and regulatory oversight (e.g. in 
food safety). This remains the case in current 
official policy and practice. The selling off of state 
assets and the transfer of functions to the private 
sector accompanied the period of departmental 
budgets with negative growth. The result 
was concentration of private ownership, the 
corporatisation of lucrative sectors and nodes 
in the value chain, and the ‘modernisation’ of 
labour relations on core farms (i.e. the removal of 
Figure 2: Provincial budgets for agriculture, 2004–2010 
(adjusted for inflation, 2009 rands)
Source: National Treasury (various years) Provincial budget: Budget statements 
Note: *2010/11 is based on an estimated inflation rate of 7%
people surplus to the requirements of capitalist 
production). This meant that three potential 
bases for a smallholder strategy (subsistence 
producers on small plots, ‘master farmers’ and 
land reform beneficiaries as new farmers) could 
not be supported during that time. By the time 
the agricultural budget started rising, new 
entrants were struggling on their own to survive 
in a rapidly liberalising market in the face of 
well-entrenched competition both in South 
Africa and globally.
This lack of public resources for agriculture, and 
the rise of concentrated agribusiness, forms the 
backdrop of the description and analysis that 
follows of how the government is approaching 
agriculture.
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43 Land reform, agricultural 
production support and 
rural development
Land reform
Two major challenges face the land reform pro-
gramme at present. The first is to speed up the 
transfer of land. The second is to support pro-
ductive use of transferred land. To date, the land 
reform programme has failed to meet its deliv-
ery targets by a wide margin. The target year 
by which 30% of agricultural land was to have 
been transferred to black farmers was changed 
from 1999 to 2014 when it became obvious that 
the original timetable was unachievable. By the 
end of September 2009, just 5.67 million hec-
tares (6.9% of agricultural land) had been trans-
ferred, ostensibly to 1.78 million beneficiaries 
(see Table 1). More than a quarter of this land 
(26%) is in the generally arid Northern Cape. 
Many of the beneficiaries, especially of the res-
titution programme, have been unable to settle 
on the land or to use it productively, either in 
terms of agreements they were compelled to 
sign with strategic partners or because of lack 
of infrastructure, input or technical support. The 
reasons for the slow pace of land reform are con-
tentious. According to the Department of Rural 
Development and Land Reform (DRDLR)2  as well 
as land activists, the main issue is the inflated cost 
of land, which the government is forced to ac-
cept because of the ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ 
policy. However, although landowners do have 
some power to determine the price, they are not 
able to make up any price they wish, since they 
are also checked by forces of demand and sup-
ply that are out of their individual control. Gov-
ernment policy on land was also a freely chosen 
option (albeit hedged with constraints) and not 
something the state was ‘forced’ into undertak-
ing. According to landowners and commercial 
farmer unions, the main problem is bureaucracy 
and institutional incapacity. It appears that a 
case can be made for both points of view. 
Average prices of farm land (adjusted for infla-
tion) did not grow significantly until 2001, after 
which they increased rapidly alongside increases 
in the broader property market (see Figure 3). 
In 2008, they took a sharp dip and this is likely 
to have continued into 2009. Under the ‘willing 
buyer, willing seller’ model, prices may be in-
flated artificially where the seller does not re-
ally want to sell. At current market prices, the 
medium-term budget has only enough money 
to buy approximately 3.2 million hectares by the 
end of 2011. This means that an additional 17 
2 Formerly the Department 
of Land Affairs. For the sake 
of consistency, the new name 
will be used throughout this 
publication. 
Table 1: Land transferred and beneficiaries, 1994–2009
Province
Redistribution & tenure Restitution Total
Number Hectares Beneficiaries Claims Hectares Beneficiaries Hectares Beneficiaries
EC 675 353 357 25 633 16 201 94 834 215 201 448 191 240 834
FS 799 350 291 7721 2 662 47 615 40 893 397 906 48 614
GP 286 34 513 7 328 13 159 9 476 70 179 43 989 77 507
KZN 690 547 414 67 761 14 752 642 447 433 168 1 189 861 500 929
LP 291 91 235 7 403 3 382 513 024 220 227 604 259 227 630
MP 444 322 839 13 950 2 694 399 876 225 877 722 715 239 827
NC 271 952 744 2 773 3 682 539 620 100 554 1 492 364 103 327
NW 300 268 566 40 539 3 709 373 642 172 963 642 208 213 502
WC 223 122 304 12 750 15 546 3 769 118 165 126 073 130 915
Total 3 979 3 043 264 185 858 75 787 2 624 303 1 597 227 5 667 567 1 783 085
Source: DRDLR, M&E Unit (courtesy Karin Kleinbooi at PLAAS) 
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million hectares would be required to meet the 
30% target by 2014. Given that less than a third 
of this has been transferred since 1994, it is not 
going to happen (Aliber & Kleinbooi 2009). An 
estimated R74 billion more would be required to 
realise the 30% target. The Land and Agrarian 
Reform Programme (LARP) document recom-
mended that the 30% land transfer target be 
shifted once again to 2025, but then funding re-
quirements would also increase (NDA 2008a). At 
the end of 2009, it was announced publicly that 
the target would indeed be shifted back to 2025 
(Ensor 2009). As Aliber and Kleinbooi (2009) 
point out, the issue is not so much about trying 
to reach an arbitrary target, especially given the 
problems already experienced with ‘chasing hec-
tares’, as it is about highlighting the wide gap 
between plans and the resources available to 
realise them.
Be that as it may, the DRDLR is not spending what 
it has available for land purchase. Although the 
land reform budget has increased rapidly in real 
terms (adjusting for inflation) since 2001 (see 
Figure 4), the increase is not so great after land 
price rises are taken into account (Aliber & Klein-
booi 2009). Even so, in the first six months of the 
2009/10 financial year, the DRDLR was able to 
spend only 31% of its land reform budget. This 
resulted in the Treasury redirecting a portion of 
the DRDLR’s budget towards funding the new 
rural development function and as a top-up for 
the restitution programme, which had already 
spent 81% of its appropriation in the first six 
months (National Treasury 2009a). For redistri-
bution, this suggests lack of capacity rather than 
lack of resources. A closer look reveals that the 
share of the budget dedicated to operational 
expenses (including salaries for people to carry 
the work out) has declined consistently for both 
the restitution and redistribution programmes 
since the late 1990s. This trend was reversed only 
last year, and for restitution the outcome was 
simply because of a precipitous decline in the 
capital budget (used for purchasing land) (Al-
iber & Kleinbooi 2009). That available resources 
for land purchase are not being used suggests a 
deeper problem that should be resolved before 
more money is demanded.
The government has adopted a Proactive Land 
Acquisition Strategy (PLAS), through which it 
buys up farm land that is available on the mar-
ket for later redistribution. Under PLAS, the state 
buys land directly from the owner, rather than 
providing grants to applicants to buy the land. 
This allows the DRDLR to sidestep the problem of 
particular landowners inflating the price of their 
land because they know that the government 
requires it for land reform. The purchased land 
is then leased to black farmers who have the op-
tion of buying it after three years. One weakness 
in practice has been the lack of timeous support 
to farmers leasing the land, which prevents them 
from engaging productively (Hofstatter 2009a). 
Land acquisition is also driven by the land avail-
able for sale, rather than the specific needs of 
those who will use it. Leasing the land for a time 
might exclude the poor who do not have cash to 
pay the rental, and the government is required 
to administer the leased land (Lahiff 2008). It is 
clear that the DRDLR does not have the capacity 
Figure 3: Average farm land prices, 1994–2008 
(adjusted for inflation, 2008 rands)
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on the ground to identify appropriate land to be 
acquired, to engage with people in identifying 
land needs and to inform the choice of land, or 
the ability to go about doing this in a systematic 
way. Here the obstacles of bureaucracy present 
themselves. Attempts have been made to decen-
tralise decision-making to the provincial and local 
levels, for example through the Provincial Land 
Reform Offices (PLROs). There is also a strategy 
to establish and participate in provincial Land 
Reform Forums and district Land Reform Com-
mittees. Area-based planning is a relatively new 
initiative, which attempts to include land reform 
in Integrated Development Plans (IDPs) at mu-
nicipal level. The idea makes sense, but resources 
and orientation at municipal level are generally 
not present to make it happen in practice.
Popular participation in these initiatives is almost 
non-existent, except where individual structures 
are handpicked for inclusion by government 
officials. There is no sense of popular mobilisation 
or mass involvement of the grassroots in the land 
reform programme. The only role for the mass 
of the population identified in policy or strategy 
with regard to land reform is as passive (potential) 
beneficiaries of state grants. What character 
does this give the programme? Technocratic and 
statist, where the state tries to do everything 
itself, yet cannot, and where the collective forces 
that do mobilise for land are ignored or actively 
suppressed. The party-state keeps control over 
the process entirely out of the hands of the 
population. This is closely connected to issues 
of control over the rural population and order, 
which, in turn, is linked to the dominant class 
forces directing the programme. Agribusiness 
and white commercial farmers have no interest 
in a mass-based mobilisation of the rural poor 
for thoroughgoing land reform in South Africa, 
whatever form that might take. Land reform is 
far more politicised than agricultural production 
and, therefore, tighter state control over its 
unfolding is imposed.
The DRDLR has attempted to respond to these 
obstacles to more rapid delivery of land. Since 
the Land Summit in 2005, there has been talk of 
changing the ‘willing seller, willing buyer’ model 
so that the government has more power over 
setting the price for which land is bought and 
sold. However, the Expropriation Bill, based on 
constitutional provisions that allow the state to 
expropriate land in the public interest, while still 
Figure 4: Land reform budgets 1996–2011 
(adjusted for inflation, 2009 rands)
Source: National Treasury (various years) National budget: Estimates of expenditure – Land 
Note: *2010/11 and 2011/12 based on an estimated inflation rate of 7%
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paying reasonable compensation to the expro-
priated, was shelved in 2008. The main concern 
from landowners was that it gave the executive 
too much authority to determine how owners 
would be compensated, rather than leaving this 
to the courts. Farmer unions were concerned 
that this could erode property rights (Hofstatter 
2009a). From a different perspective, as long as 
the land reform programme is based on the pur-
chase of land on a market-related basis (which 
even the expropriations would be), it is not go-
ing to make a significant difference to the price 
of land or to the possibility of transferring land 
to the African majority. Buying into the 30% re-
distribution target (whether within 5 years or 
30 years) goes only part of the way to resolving 
the fundamental injustice of forcible disposses-
sion of land. In the process, it becomes a block 
to thinking about the bigger picture, engender-
ing amnesia about the scale of dispossession in 
South Africa. The land reform programme at 
present is nowhere near addressing the reality 
that landholding in South Africa is amongst the 
most inequitably distributed in the world. Until 
landholding is more evenly distributed between 
black and white in proportion to their numbers 
in the population at large, this fundamental in-
justice will remain alive. That means a target of 
closer to 90% of land should be redistributed 
to Africans. Within the current programme and 
approach, this will never happen, and brings us 
into very difficult territory.
By all rights, around 90% of all land should be 
taken back without compensation and trans-
ferred to the black population and to Africans 
in particular. This raises questions about how to 
compensate white farmers for the investments 
they have made in the land (acknowledging that 
much of the actual work of converting those in-
vestments into added value was carried out by 
super-exploited black farm workers). An associ-
ated issue is how, during the transition to more 
equitable landownership, to retain the agricul-
tural skills and knowledge that white farmers 
currently hold. Then there is the issue of how 
to ensure that national food production is not 
destroyed in the process of changing owner-
ship and production systems. These are very big 
and difficult questions not yet on the national 
agenda but which, as in Zimbabwe, may become 
more pertinent as time passes with little signifi-
cant change in landownership or the structure 
of production.
Agricultural production 
support
The second fundamental challenge facing the 
DRDLR is ensuring support for productive activity 
on the land once it is transferred. Immediately, 
we can feel the narrowness of the approaches, 
linked as they are to a very controlled, top-down 
programme, with exceedingly modest goals 
in the broader scheme of things. Agricultural 
support has shifted from support to large-scale 
(white) commercial farmers to black emerging 
farmers, with the aim of assisting the latter 
to become commercial farmers in their own 
right. Yet, as highlighted above, the budget 
was decimated in the period of restructuring, 
essentially destroying much of the physical 
and social infrastructure that might have been 
built on to support emerging farmers. During 
this time, policy was slow to generate any 
meaningful impact. The government’s first 
flagship black farmer support programme, 
the Broadening Access to Agriculture Thrust 
(BATAT), established a number of work areas 
in finance, technology and marketing, but 
generally this was not carried through into 
practical applications. The logic of BATAT was 
that farming had to be ‘market-related pro-
duction, therefore subsistence farming, with 
family income generated by non-farm activi-
ties, cannot be considered viable farming’ (Van 
Empel 1997: 2). While this was not against small-
scale farming as such, it did shift support onto 
a commercial track, thus relegating non-market 
production to the background. Until 2003, the 
National Department of Agriculture, now the 
Department of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries 
(DAFF)3 provided limited support to new farmers 
for agricultural production. The dismantling 
of agricultural development corporations and 
the decline of the extension service meant that 
while farmers received support in accessing land, 
they were then left more or less on their own. 
Production inputs were left to the ‘free market’, 
with some basic state regulation on standards.
The Comprehensive Agricultural Support Pro-
gramme (CASP) is at the core of state support 
to farmers. It was established in 2003, follow-
ing the Strauss Commission’s recommendations 
that the state provide a ‘sunrise’ package of sup-
port to newly settled farmers. CASP identified 
six areas of intervention and four categories of 
beneficiary. The six intervention areas were: on-
farm and off-farm infrastructure; advisory and 
regulatory services; capacity building; informa-
3 Henceforth, the new name 
will be used throughout for the 
sake of consistency, except in 
the case of documents in which 
the earlier name is used.
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tion and training; market development; and fi-
nancial services. The Micro Agricultural Financial 
Institutions of South Africa (Mafisa) programme 
is the product of the sixth intervention. CASP’s 
target groups were: the hungry and vulnerable; 
household food security and subsistence; farm- 
and business -level activity; and the agricultural 
macro-system, linked to the consumer environ-
ment (NDA 2005a).
CASP is funded through a conditional grant from 
DAFF to provincial departments. Conditional 
grants ring-fence funds so that they cannot be 
allocated to other activities. CASP constitutes a 
significant portion of the agricultural support 
services in DAFF. In 2009/10, R817 million was 
made available to all provincial departments for 
CASP, Land Care, Illima/Letsema and veld fire 
prevention combined (National Treasury 2009b). 
This translates into an average per province of 
less than R100 million per year for small farmer 
support, which is unevenly divided, with the 
more ‘rural’ provinces of the Eastern Cape, Kwa-
Zulu-Natal and Limpopo receiving larger shares. 
The amount allocated is expected to increase to 
over R1.4 billion by 2011/12, but that is still an av-
erage of just R155 million per province, which in-
cludes capital expenses. Allocations to CASP are 
expected to rise by an average of 22% per year 
over the medium term. 
CASP provided support to more than 300 000 
beneficiaries in more than 4 200 projects be-
tween 2004/05 and 2008/09 (NDA 2009a). How-
ever, the number of people expected to benefit 
from the programme declined from 89 000 in 
2005/06 (a target that was not realised) to a 
planned 32 000 in 2011/12 (National Treasury 
2009b). While 35 000 people were expected to 
benefit from the programme in 2009/10, after 6 
months a mere 533 people had received support 
via CASP (National Treasury 2009c). The reason 
given is that provinces do not have the capac-
ity to deliver. CASP is certain to be one of the 
main sources of finance for the realisation of the 
Comprehensive Rural Development Programme 
(CRDP). The ‘agrarian transformation’ compo-
nent of the programme relates directly to pro-
duction support for smallholder farmers. Never-
theless, despite the future growth in resources 
for agricultural support, resources for small-scale 
farmer support remain limited.
Provincial farmer support programmes have ex-
panded significantly, and in 2009 constituted 
the biggest sub-programme in all provinces 
except Gauteng and the North West. Between 
2005 and 2011, (medium-term estimate) average 
expenditure on farmer support across the nine 
provinces vacillated between 37% and 41% of 
the total budget for agriculture.4 There is a sig-
nificant upward trend in the share of the budget 
dedicated to farmer support in Mpumalanga, the 
Free State, Northern Cape and Western Cape, 
and a slight upward trend in KwaZulu-Natal and 
Gauteng. The share of the budget in the East-
ern Cape and Limpopo is fairly steady, though 
4Provincial agriculture budgets. 
For the North West, Gauteng 
and KwaZulu-Natal, the total 
budget includes conservation 
and environment.
Figure 5: Provincial farmer support programme budgets, 
2005–2010 (adjusted for inflation, 2009 rands) 
Source: National Treasury (various years) Provincial budget: Budget statements
Note: *2010/11 is based on an estimated inflation rate of 7%
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it should be noted that farmer support already 
constituted a large share of the budget in these 
two provinces in 2005. The North West is the only 
province with a sharp decline in the share of the 
budget going to farmer support. This should be 
understood in the light of internal problems in 
that department in recent years. 
Despite rhetoric about indigenous knowledge 
and food security, the government has not at-
tempted to build alternative seed production ca-
pability. At present, just three community seed 
production schemes, in Limpopo and Mpuma-
langa, are being piloted with state funding. Al-
though the government does subsidise seed and 
chemicals through provincial agricultural sup-
port programmes, often in partnership with the 
private sector, the seed and agrochemical sec-
tors (with the exception of fertiliser, which has 
significant parastatal input) have always been 
private-sector driven and, apart from basic regu-
lation, the post-apartheid government has not 
intervened in these sectors. This has resulted in 
growing concentration in these sectors as larger, 
more successful firms have bought out smaller 
ones or merged into bigger corporations, espe-
cially over the past 15 to 20 years. Between them, 
the top ten seed companies have rights over al-
most two-thirds of registered seed varieties in 
South Africa. At the top of the list is Pannar, a 
South African company that incorporates Pannar 
Seeds and Starke Ayres. Four of the biggest seed 
companies in the world are also dominant in the 
South African seed sector: Monsanto, Syngenta, 
DuPont/Pioneer Hi-Bred and Sakata (ACB 2009). 
While both genetically modified (GM) seed and 
hybrid seed are commercially dominant in some 
sectors (maize, sunflower and grain sorghum), 
open-pollinated varieties have remained remark-
ably resilient in most crops produced in South 
Africa. This suggests the possibility of building 
alternative seed sources that are not dependent 
on the technological processes that have been 
captured by profit-driven corporations. 
The agrochemicals industry is also highly concen-
trated, with a heavy presence of multinationals. 
In the 1990s, the fertiliser sector was rationalised 
following deregulation and liberalisation. Local 
production capacity was closed down and South 
Africa became a net importer of fertiliser for the 
first time around 2000. The sector is dominated 
by three corporations: Sasol Nitro, Yara5 and 
Omnia, with Foskor a significant input provider. 
An estimated 70% of agrochemicals (both fer-
tilisers and pesticides) used in South Africa are 
imported. Eight of the ten largest pesticide mul-
tinationals in the world operate in the South Af-
rican market, with the local market dominated 
by Bayer, Dow, Makhteshim-Agan and Syngen-
ta, in particular (ACB 2009). Fertiliser prices rose 
by over 200% between the end of 2006 and the 
end of 2008, when prices exceeded R6 000/ton 
(FSSA 2009). Although prices dropped rapidly 
after that, along with the decline in commodity 
prices that was part of the global economic col-
lapse, it signifies the volatility of agrochemical 
prices and the dependency of South Africa on 
world markets.
Concentration of production has allowed large 
companies to make windfall profits in times of 
crisis, while poorer farmers cannot afford to 
purchase necessary inputs. What determines the 
price of inputs? Since agrochemicals are essen-
tially oil-based, the price of oil is one of the key 
factors. The exchange rate is another, since most 
agrochemicals are imported. There are several 
questions that policy-makers have not got to yet. 
If South African agriculture is to continue to rely 
on oil-based fertilisers and agrochemicals, what 
opportunities exist for manufacturing these lo-
cally? Beyond that, what changes in production 
methods are possible in the near, medium and 
long term to shift agriculture onto a path that is 
not so reliant on these chemicals? As soon as the 
global economy starts growing again, oil prices 
are going to start rising rapidly. Thus, the global 
economy is caught in a vice between recession 
and unsustainably high input costs. This is the 
basis for a rethink of the global capitalist model, 
even if it is still within the framework of ecologi-
cal modernisation. We cannot continue to rely 
on non-renewable energy sources, and that in-
cludes inputs into agriculture. So the quicker we 
can start working out ways to shift, the better. 
There has been very little consideration of this in 
the approach to agriculture taken in South Af-
rica to date. A critical component of input sup-
ply must be the provision of alternative methods 
of production that rely less on oil-based physical 
inputs. 
Water, seed and 
agrochemicals
The National Water Act 36 of 1988 forms the 
basis for current water policy with regard to 
agriculture. In essence, the Act separates owner-
ship of land from ownership of water (riparian 
rights) and vests the latter in the state. This is a 
radical shift, but is accompanied by the agree-
5 A Norwegian multinational, 
formerly known as Norsk 
Hydro, which purchased 
Kynoch, a South African com-
pany.
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ment that previous patterns of use could remain, 
within a system of registration of these uses. Ag-
ricultural producers must register as water users 
and request access to water. This arrangement 
has permitted the state to set aside water for 
basic needs and ecological purposes. The long-
term goal is for these allocation functions to be 
devolved to Catchment Management Agencies 
(CMAs), which theoretically consist of all stake-
holders in a catchment area, but which in reality 
are dominated by those with resources and ca-
pacity to develop, articulate and lobby for their 
own policy positions. In 2006, a Water Allocation 
Reform policy was drawn up that aimed to over-
come the ongoing race and gender imbalances 
in access to water resources. The policy links wa-
ter allocation to the establishment and support 
of broad-based black economic enterprise (BEE). 
After water has been allocated for basic liveli-
hoods needs, those enterprises that meet BEE 
criteria will be prioritised for water allocation 
(DWAF 2006). Nevertheless, the strategy does 
state that existing lawful uses should not be ‘ar-
bitrarily curtailed’.
There is recognition at the highest levels that the 
link between land reform, agricultural support 
and water resource provision is weak. There are 
two approaches to dealing with this: investing in 
irrigation both for commercial and for resource-
poor farmers, and linking water provision to the 
land transfer process. In 1996, just 3.7% of 46 486 
hectares of irrigated land in South Africa were 
used for food plot and small-scale farming. The 
former homelands had a potential area of 200 
000 hectares that could be used for irrigation 
(Jacobs, Aliber, Hart & O’Donovan 2009, citing 
Water Research Commission report). DAFF set a 
target of 100 000 hectares of irrigated land to be 
established or rehabilitated by 2011 (NDA 2008b). 
To date, a literature review and guidelines have 
been approved (DAFF 2009a). A policy from 2004 
proposes a once-off grant on the capital cost 
for the construction and/or upgrading of irriga-
tion schemes to resource-poor farmers who are 
members of water-user associations (WUAs) or 
other approved legal entities. A further grant is 
proposed for operation and maintenance costs, 
and water resource management and deprecia-
tion charges are to be phased out over six years. 
Other proposed grants are included to cover 
the acquisition of water entitlements, socio-
economic viability studies, training for manage-
ment committees of WUAs, and rainwater tanks 
for family food production and other productive 
uses (DWAF 2004). Irrigation boards are being 
transformed into WUAs, although this is a slow 
process. Of the 279 irrigation boards, 68 were 
transformed into 38 WUAs by 2009. A further 
23 WUAs have been established, focusing mainly 
on resource-poor farmers (DWEA 2009).
The Presidency’s Medium-Term Strategic Frame-
work (2009–2014) identifies the construction of 
irrigation infrastructure as a strategic priority. 
Significant emphasis is placed on rehabilitating 
or constructing large-scale schemes such as the 
Mokolo River Augmentation Project, the Vaal-
harts/Taung and Makhathini irrigation schemes. 
Major rehabilitation projects will be undertaken 
in these initiatives to upgrade infrastructure, 
with R650 million being dedicated to this activity 
up to 2011/12 (DWEA 2009). There is also some ac-
tivity around the revitalisation of small-scale irri-
gation schemes, mainly in the former homeland 
areas. Land revitalised under the programme is 
expected to rise from 29 000 hectares in 2008/09 
to 36 000 hectares in 2011/12 (National Treasury 
2009b). In most provinces, CASP (see below) pro-
vides additional resources for irrigation develop-
ment.
While irrigation is necessary to increase produc-
tivity on the land, in a context of water scarcity 
and climate change one has to ask whether ir-
rigation is the best way forward. Irrigation uses 
at least 60% of all water in South Africa (Van 
der Merwe 2008). About 60% of irrigation wa-
ter applied globally does not reach the targeted 
crops. Alternative methods of irrigation, such as 
drip or micro-irrigation, can increase efficiency. 
While the initial cost is more expensive, water 
wastage is reduced to 5–10% (Miller & Spoolman 
2008). A countrywide increase in irrigation effi-
ciency of just 10% can save a third of the capac-
ity of the Vaal Dam every year (Van der Merwe 
2008). While there are some small-scale efforts 
to deal with adaptation to climate change, in-
cluding water harvesting, and altering produc-
tion towards more drought-tolerant crops, these 
efforts do not match the scale of the challenge 
facing agricultural producers, especially those in 
drier areas with limited resources of their own.
The second approach is to integrate water allo-
cation with land reform. Both the National Plan-
ning Commission and the CRDP emphasise the 
productive use of water and the alignment of 
water resource allocation with land reform. To 
date, integration has occurred only in irrigation 
schemes where land has been transferred. The 
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Department of Water and Environmental Affairs 
(DWEA) is prioritising land reform projects in 
Limpopo and the Eastern Cape in 2009/10, Kwa-
Zulu-Natal and the Northern Cape the following 
year, the North West and Free State in 2011/12, 
and the Western Cape, Mpumalanga and Gau-
teng in 2012/13. The plan is to increase the al-
location of water licenses to 40% of historically 
disadvantaged individuals (HDIs) by 2014 (DWEA 
2009). Ensuring that water is available to land 
reform farms is essential and must be built into 
the planning stages at the outset. Many land re-
form farms have failed precisely because water 
has not been available for production.
Integrating land reform and 
agricultural support
The government’s two main programmes are 
the Land Redistribution for Agricultural Devel-
opment (LRAD) programme in land reform, and 
CASP in agricultural support. These have oper-
ated as separate programmes for most of their 
existence. The implementation of CASP was 
not synchronised with LRAD or with provincial 
farmer support programmes (e.g. the Massive 
Food Production Programme in the Eastern 
Cape, Sibuyela Emasimini in Mpumalanga and 
Siyavuna in KwaZulu-Natal) and, in reality, fo-
cused only on the provision of on- and off-farm 
infrastructure, and, therefore, was not compre-
hensive. Separate reviews of LRAD and CASP 
called for a further de-emphasis on collective 
farming, decentralisation of services to districts 
and municipalities, embedding land reform in 
IDPs, a single grant and approval process for 
land redistribution and agricultural support, and 
increasing participation by beneficiaries (NDA 
2008a). This resulted in the development in 2008 
of LARP, which sought to integrate CASP with 
the land reform programme. CASP guidelines re-
quire that 70% of funds go to land reform; but 
there are no guidelines, in LARP or anywhere 
else, about how these funds are to be allocated 
further.
In 2008, LARP was established between DAFF 
and DRDLR and the provincial departments of 
agriculture, essentially to integrate LRAD and 
CASP. Its short-term objectives were: the distri-
bution of 5 million hectares of land to 10 000 
beneficiaries; increasing the number of new 
agriculture entrepreneurs by 10–15%, providing 
universal support; increasing agricultural produc-
tion by 10–15% through the Illima/Letsema cam-
paign; and increasing market access by 10–15% 
(NDA 2008a). The programme identifies contract 
farming for high value and feedstock products, 
such as bio-fuels, wine, essential oils, hemp, 
medicines, leather, juices, canning and dairy, as 
a key intervention (NDA 2008a). A major prob-
lem with contract farming arrangements is that 
they merely insert smallholder farmers as jun-
ior players in the existing agricultural structure. 
Contract farmers may find themselves squeezed 
into a relationship of debt and dependency, car-
rying the full risks of production and faced with 
the increasing power of agribusiness, result-
ing in lower prices for their produce. Contract 
farming is also often accompanied by decreased 
food production and an increase in food inse-
curity as a result of concentration on contract 
crops (Kirsten & Sartorius 2002). The targets set 
by LARP were two-year targets (to be achieved 
by March 2010), although the programme is in-
tended to continue for at least five years. LARP’s 
focus on the provision of larger landholdings has 
raised concerns about its effects on equity, with 
larger-scale farmers likely to receive the bulk of 
resources for land reform (Lahiff 2008).
Despite falling under the same ministry until 
2009, there has always been a disconnection be-
tween the transfer of land and meaningful agri-
cultural support for those to whom the land has 
been transferred. This has entailed either the 
collapse of existing commercial farms that were 
transferred, or the failure of newly established 
farms. By 2009, the government had acquired a 
total of 2 864 farms for black farmers, at a cost 
of R6.25 billion. About 44% of these were trans-
ferred through the LRAD programme, started in 
2001, which emphasised individual ownership. 
By 2009, 29% of LRAD projects had failed out-
right, and a further 22% were in decline, due 
mainly to lack of ‘post-settlement’ support (Sapa 
2009). Part of the problem here is that land re-
form is a national competency, while agriculture 
is a concurrent national and provincial compe-
tency. The two departments have never really 
gelled, with the Department of Agriculture not 
considering land reform beneficiaries as one of 
its key constituencies until recently. This is prob-
ably the product of the conceptualisation of 
land reform as a poverty-alleviation or welfarist 
strategy in the first five years of the programme. 
The first land reform programme (based on the 
Settlement and Land Acquisition Grant) and the 
restitution programme both transferred land to 
large groups of people. The dominant mindset 
12
Status report on land and agricultural policy in South Africa
in DAFF, however, was oriented towards individ-
ual commercial producers; consequently, group 
beneficiaries were de-prioritised. With the adop-
tion of LRAD, the link between agriculture and 
redistribution (if not restitution) became more 
explicit and has strengthened since then. The in-
troduction of the notion of agrarian reform has 
enabled the government to combine land redis-
tribution and agricultural support, even if the 
conceptualisation of agrarian reform might be a 
bit shallow. Diversifying the base of production 
– through de-racialisation and increasing the va-
riety of production unit size – is a very important 
component of agrarian reform, and will have 
economic and structural impacts. This can occur 
despite the existing framework of exploitative 
social and environmental practices. 
The decision to disconnect land reform from ag-
riculture at an institutional level into separate 
ministries is surprising and counter-intuitive. This 
is especially the case as the CRDP relies heavily 
on DAFF, both for technical support and for the 
provision of resources to realise the programme. 
It is interesting to note that sections of commer-
cial agriculture (including the Transvaal Agri-
cultural Union) had lobbied for the separation 
of agricultural from land reform to shield com-
mercial agriculture from the instability caused 
by the land reform programme. The disconnec-
tion between the two threatens to reinforce the 
dualism of DAFF supporting commercial agricul-
ture with DRDLR performing a welfarist function 
for the rural poor. At the same time, the CRDP 
brings agriculture forcefully into the picture, 
and its success will require a large proportion of 
DAFF’s budget (especially Farmer Support and 
CASP) to be directed towards it. So, although 
there is an institutional separation, responsibil-
ity for smallholder support remains in both min-
istries. At the moment, it looks as though DRDLR 
will be responsible for facilitating co-ordination 
and planning, while DAFF will be responsible for 
implementation. This is a fairly uncomfortable 
arrangement, which is likely to be inefficient.
Restitution beneficiaries are still not considered 
primary targets for DAFF. The Commission on 
Restitution of Land Rights (CRLR) has been un-
able to articulate the link clearly, and there is lit-
tle certainty on who provides what kind of post-
settlement support. The post-settlement support 
units in the CRLR should not consider agricul-
tural production as their primary concern, partly 
because they do not have the technical skills for 
this and partly because it is the mandate of a 
different department. Instead, post-settlement 
support from the CRLR should focus on assist-
ing to build the communal property associations 
(CPAs), facilitating conflict resolution, transfer-
ring organisational skills, and so on. DAFF should 
then work with the CPAs to develop agricultural 
plans. This does not happen in any systematic 
way at present.
Rural development and its 
relationship with land reform 
and agriculture
South African macro-policy emerges from a 
strategic perspective that emphasises urban 
job creation as the key development task fac-
ing the state. The National Spatial Development 
Perspective (NSDP) (The Presidency 2006) is the 
most explicit articulation of this vision, which fits 
precisely into the World Bank’s current theoreti-
cal framework (World Bank 2009). It is hard to 
tell what the future of this perspective is. The 
new administration is emphasising rural devel-
opment, which runs counter to the earlier strate-
gic vision that limited rural development to com-
mercial agriculture plus basic welfare for those 
unable to obtain work in the urban areas. The 
new National Planning Commission’s Medium-
Term Strategic Framework (MTSF), which applies 
to the government as a whole, states that the 
NSDP will be reviewed and, where appropri-
ate, adjusted, but does not go any further (NPC 
2009).
Rural development was one of the five key pri-
orities identified by the tripartite alliance at the 
ANC’s watershed Polokwane conference in 2007. 
According to Blade Nzimande, General Secretary 
of the South African Communist Party (SACP), 
rural development was identified at the confer-
ence not just as a sector in need of more ‘deliv-
ery’, but as a priority area requiring radical, sys-
temic transformation and as a catalyst for wider 
societal transformation (Nzimande 2009). The 
SACP launched its Red October Campaign on 
Land and Agrarian Reform in 2004, and realised 
some of its goals with regard to seizing the ini-
tiative from what it referred to as the ‘extreme 
left’ (Nzimande 2004), as well as contributing to 
realising a shift in the government’s approach 
to rural development and agrarian reform. Five 
years on, however, the strategies that were pro-
posed during the campaign, of mass-based peo-
ple’s land committees, land forums that include 
women, the landless and farm workers, and a 
‘use it or lose it’ clause applying to white com-
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mercial farmers rather than land reform ben-
eficiaries (SACP 2005), all remain a pipedream. 
While the SACP has made impressive gains in 
getting its position on land and agrarian reform 
accepted in the alliance and the state, it has 
fared less well with its plans to mobilise the ru-
ral population. This and the decline of the Land-
less People’s Movement (LPM) since 2004 are a 
further indication of the difficulties in building 
and sustaining rural organisation and mobilisa-
tion. The recent turn towards rural development 
should be understood, then, in the context of 
open class contestation within the state, a left 
driven by the industrial working class, and weak 
rural mobilisation. There are opportunities for 
gains by the rural poor, while recognising that 
as long as the rural poor and marginalised re-
main disorganised and unable to drive change 
in the rural areas through their own activity, it is 
unlikely that grand plans will be realised. 
The latest manifestation of rural development is 
the CRDP under DRDLR. Rural development has 
never had its own ministerial portfolio, although 
it did have unsuccessful institutional homes, first 
in the Presidency and then in the Department 
of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG). Its 
elevation to a ministry could signify an advance 
in that respect. However, the very decision to 
conceptualise the task as ‘rural development’ 
places it in an ‘incredibly powerful semantic con-
stellation’ of development based on defining a 
pre-established path of growth that robs people 
of their agency (Esteva 1992: 8). Immediate con-
cerns have been raised about giving the old De-
partment of Land Affairs (DLA), which patently 
failed to carry out its mandate of delivering land 
reform, additional tasks. It might have been bet-
ter to give the new department the mandate of 
building capacity to implement land reform, and 
of ensuring a strong link between this and ag-
riculture. Instead, not only are agriculture and 
land reform now institutionally split from one 
another, but the weak DLA is being given the 
enormous and complex task (with few extra re-
sources or staff) of co-ordinating rural develop-
ment across three spheres of government, as well 
as delivering on land reform (Pienaar 2009).
The CRDP is conceptualised on the basis of three 
integrated pillars: rural development (defined 
as infrastructure), agrarian transformation (es-
sentially defined as production support) and 
land reform. A primary focus is on using natu-
ral resources as the basis for economic develop-
ment, and on people taking control over their 
own destiny (MRDLR 2009). Suffice it to say that, 
for now, the CRDP strongly emphasises the idea 
of integrating land reform and agricultural sup-
port. The CRDP is being piloted at seven sites (of 
which three are currently under way), using the 
‘War on Poverty’ methodology, which theoreti-
cally is about high-level co-ordination of activity 
by different departments based on household 
profiling and community planning. In reality, 
it looks more like a desperate flurry to achieve 
something in the very short term without pre-
paring the ground adequately. The ‘War on Pov-
erty’ campaign was an initiative of the Presiden-
cy in the lead-up to the 2009 national elections 
to make it appear that the government was on 
the ground and acting. The CRDP pilots in Gi-
yani (Limpopo), Riemvasmaak (Northern Cape) 
and Qwa-Qwa (Free State) appear to be equally 
rushed, hitting the ground very shortly after the 
new ministry was announced and in the absence 
of any developed policy that presents a strategic 
orientation.
In the CRDP, five categories of farmer are identi-
fied as targets for land reform:
• ‘landless households’ seeking small pieces of 
land for subsistence production;
• ‘commercial-ready subsistence producers’ 
wanting to expand and farm part-time;
• ‘expanding commercial smallholders’ already 
producing commercially but wanting to ex-
pand;
• ‘well-established black commercial farmers’ 
already producing and having the potential 
to become large-scale farmers; and
• ‘financially capable aspirant black commer-
cial farmers’, namely business people want-
ing to diversify into agriculture. (MRDLR 
2009:18)
For the first time, the actual base of beneficiaries 
is clearly identified. It is also useful that DRDLR 
is moving beyond a one-size-fits-all approach to 
land reform and agricultural support. However, 
it is not clear where the majority of the existing 
beneficiaries of the land redistribution and res-
titution programmes fit in. They are people with 
secure access to land, but with limited resources 
of their own, and often without deep agricultur-
al skills. What approach could be developed that 
might allow them to try their hand at agriculture 
and see whether that could take off? However, 
even before that question is asked, is it a priority 
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for the government to support the mending of 
existing dysfunctional projects (RDSCW 2009)? 
An immediate target of the rural development 
programme was to provide 50–100 km of live-
stock fencing per province within the first 100 
days of the programme’s launch (MRDLR 2009).
Who or what are the ‘motive forces’ in the new 
Rural Development Programme? In the imme-
diate term, the DRDLR, DAFF, the Presidency 
and the Development Bank of South Africa 
are tasked with overseeing the initial projects 
(DRDLR 2009). In version 1 of the CRDP released 
on 22 July 2009, the task of the DRDLR is as ‘an 
initiator, facilitator, co-ordinator and catalyst’ of 
rural development interventions (DRDLR 2009: 
12). A detailed proposal to establish a Rural De-
velopment Agency is to be developed by May 
2012. The agency would take over co-ordination, 
planning, resource mobilisation, monitoring 
and evaluation (M&E) and facilitation (MRDLR 
2009:32). However, an agency should not be seen 
as a panacea for lack of capacity in the DRDLR, 
because ‘if the principal is weak, the agent will 
be weak’ (Pienaar 2009: 3). 
The critical role of local government in co-ordi-
nating and facilitating activities at local level is 
entrenched as part of the discourse of the state. 
However, it is coming under question from both 
outside the state, as citizens lose faith in the 
state’s ability to deliver on its promises (see Pow-
ell 2009), and from inside the party-state (see 
Carrim 2009). A restructuring of local govern-
ment will be driven by the broader perspective 
of what development is and how it is anticipated 
that it will unfold. In this context, it appears that 
the DRDLR is moving to occupy the jurisdiction 
of local government, by playing an intervention-
ist and co-ordinating role in development at the 
local level (Pienaar 2009). This relates directly 
to the increasingly articulated suggestion that 
there should be more active intervention by 
national and provincial government in munici-
palities unable to function on their own (Carrim 
2009).
The CRDP makes reference to a ‘partnership with 
all sectors of society’ as well as to general par-
ticipation by civil society. The framework docu-
ment improves on the earlier concept note by 
recognising the role of civil society organisations 
(CSOs), especially in terms of social and technical 
facilitation. Critical stakeholders are overwhelm-
ingly government departments and the mu-
nicipalities, with ‘community organisations and 
leadership’ also recognised as significant stake-
holders (MRDLR 2009: 23). It is envisaged that a 
council of stakeholders, consisting of the govern-
ment and CSOs, will oversee processes and assist 
with planning and needs identification. Never-
theless, the government will play the dominant 
role in driving the programme, with provincial-
level technical committees, consisting of sector 
departments, implementing the activities. Below 
these, co-operatives/enterprise groups consist-
ing of 20 households will be formed to link the 
citizenry to the process.
There is a relatively low level of rural civil society 
organisation in South Africa driven by a political 
consciousness based on justice, active organisa-
tion and resistance to imposed power. CSOs with 
land and agriculture amongst their priorities are 
overwhelmingly products either of the activities 
of donor-funded non-governmental organisa-
tions (NGOs) or the government itself. The par-
ty-state has identified co-operatives as a form 
of organisation that should be encouraged. Co-
operative development is being driven by the 
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). While 
the policy seeks to encourage those with the 
values of self-reliance and self-help to form co-
operatives, this is within a framework explicitly 
geared towards entrepreneurship, economic 
growth and competitiveness (DTI 2004).
Given civil society’s weakness in organising itself 
independently of the state, DAFF has taken on 
the job of assisting farmers to organise them-
selves into co-operatives and commodity groups. 
In 2008/09, it established 324 co-operatives and 
208 self-help groups countrywide (NDA 2009a). 
This suggests that DAFF recognises the impor-
tance of having an organised constituency to 
engage with. But what is the character of these 
formations? One can understand why a well-
meaning government official would be commit-
ted to setting up representative structures of 
farmers and the rural poor that can be engaged 
with and supported to grow over time. One step 
back, this is justified by the dominant ideologi-
cal approach, which instrumentalises the role of 
grassroots struggle and organisation as fulfill-
ing a ‘strategic goal’ defined not by the grass-
roots themselves, but by political vanguards, 
and which credits the state as the prime agent 
of transformation (Shivji, in Mngxitama 2005). 
However, there are several critical questions. 
What capacity is being developed to enable these 
formations to set their own agendas? What hap-
pens if state resources dry up or are diverted to 
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other activities? Do these organisations have the 
potential to challenge government programmes 
and agendas, or does the way they are inserted 
into the government ‘delivery machine’ struc-
turally preclude this? To what extent can they 
be considered to be independent CSOs? These 
questions, in turn, raise further issues about 
what role the state can conceivably play in at 
least facilitating space for the rise of independ-
ent grassroots organisations. What alternative 
ways of building independent organisation are 
being attempted in society at present?
There are only a few NGOs and agricultural trade 
unions countrywide that work consistently with 
the rural poor on land and agricultural issues. 
The weakness of rural organisation has its roots, 
in part, in the political orientation of the NGOs, 
historically caught in a tension between liberal 
welfarism and a statism that credits the state as 
the primary agent of transformation (Mngxita-
ma 2005). Some independent mobilising efforts 
have been carried out, mainly behind the cover 
of NGO-type formations that have a radical ori-
entation but which have adjusted their tactics 
to suit the strength of the grassroots. There is 
also an idea of building up the practical basis for 
change on the ground, including building alli-
ances with other grassroots movements. What-
ever the situation, it is highly unlikely that radi-
cal transformation will come about if civil society 
is dependent on the state for its organisational 
maintenance. As Mngxitama argues, the reli-
ance on NGOs to organise the rural areas is ‘an 
indictment not so much for the liberals, but of 
the liberation movement’s failure as a whole’ 
(Mngxitama 2005: 49).
Although there is hardly a word about 
agribusiness or commercial farmers in the 
CRDP (apart from some general references 
to mentoring), the Zuma administration has 
inherited some fairly well-established structures 
of agricultural policy-making, which are built 
in principle on commercial agriculture. In 2001, 
Thabo Mbeki established the Presidential 
Working Group on Agriculture, which meets 
intermittently with the president to discuss 
matters relating to the development of the 
agricultural sector. This initially included AgriSA, 
the National African Farmers’ Union (NAFU) 
and the Agribusiness Chamber (ABC). One of 
its first tasks was to develop the Strategic Plan 
for Agriculture, which was taken to the Cabinet 
for approval in 2001 (NDA 2001). A review of 
the plan was concluded in 2008 through the 
CEO Forum, a structure allied with the Working 
Group (see below). Amongst other things, the 
working group developed a shared vision for 
labour relations and for land reform.
In 2008, a Ministerial Advisory Council (MAC) was 
formed that included TAU SA, AgriSA, NAFU, the 
ACB and the South African Agricultural Proces-
sors Association (SAAPA). It was later extended 
to include civil society (even if it still ‘keeps it in 
the family’), in the form of the Food and Agri-
cultural Workers Union (FAWU), Women for 
Agricultural and Rural Development (WARD) 
and Youth for Agricultural and Rural Develop-
ment (YARD), the latter two being state-spon-
sored interest groups (MAC 2009). However, the 
commercial farmer unions and agribusiness or-
ganisations are considered to be the ‘principals’ 
and meet both prior to MAC meetings to set 
the agenda and afterwards to assess the meet-
ing and prepare an action plan. So, in essence, 
non-business CSOs are invited to only part of the 
meeting. NAFU, the black farmers’ parallel struc-
ture to AgriSA, is being nurtured by the state 
to play a role similar to that of AgriSA. It re-
ceives annual financial support from DAFF, and 
its place is reserved in high-level policy-making 
structures. A CEO Forum, consisting of heads of 
agribusinesses and the Director-General in DAFF, 
with the CEO Forum Steering Committee as its 
operational arm, meets on a more regular ba-
sis to strategise on key issues in the agricultural 
sector (MAC 2009). This is a concrete manifesta-
tion of the corporatist state, in which business 
and government jointly strategise. It is apparent 
from this inherited model that participation of 
the grassroots comes only after the fundamen-
tal frameworks for agricultural and land reform 
have already been designed in the interests of 
agribusiness and commercial agriculture. This is 
not to say that the latter will not accede to de-
mands for land reform or state support to black 
farmers, but the process is controlled to ensure 
that the primary yardstick of ‘globally competi-
tive and profitable agriculture’ is not tampered 
with.
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4 Farm workers and farm 
dwellers
In the agricultural restructuring that continued 
throughout the political transition in South Af-
rica, the paternalist power structure on farms 
was replaced partially by a regulatory regime 
that established a formal labour relations frame-
work, which sought to modernise labour rela-
tions on commercial farms. However, it was not 
adequately enforced and did not make it much 
easier for farm workers to organise. As the struc-
ture of agriculture was destabilised by market 
forces becoming more dominant, so destabilisa-
tion was transferred to the workforce. The re-
sult was large-scale job losses, casualisation of 
the workforce and a reduction in the contribu-
tion farm employment made to livelihoods for 
many workers. From a peak of over 1.6 million 
workers (permanent and temporary) in 1971, the 
number of workers had declined to 628 000 by 
2005 (NDA 2009). The 2007 Agricultural Survey 
shows there were 432 000 full-time workers and 
365 000 seasonal workers in that year (Stats SA 
2009). The decline did not slow down with the 
completion of the restructuring programme. 
In part, this was because of a shift in marginal 
areas from field crops to livestock, which uses 
less labour. Even where labour-intensive horti-
cultural production expanded to take advan-
tage of new export opportunities, the trend 
was towards consolidating a smaller core of per-
manent workers and increasing the number of 
casual workers. More generally, what this shows 
is that neo-liberalisation is not an event that has 
a clearly defined end, but is an ongoing process 
of restructuring that has heightened instability 
and insecurity both for workers and for capital-
ists (although not with equal consequences).
Market forces combined with legislation govern-
ing agricultural labour to modernise the sector. 
In the mid-1990s, core labour legislation was 
extended to farm workers through the Labour 
Relations Act 66 of 1995 and the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Act 75 of 1997. This was a step 
forward, but the state’s limited monitoring and 
enforcement of the Acts has meant that it has 
been mainly reactive in dealing with transgres-
sions. This requires someone to report the case 
to government officials. The Department of La-
bour has battled to retain inspectors, and only 
half of the 1 600 posts (for all economic sectors) 
were filled in 2007 (Bailey 2007). In agriculture 
alone, which is a minor sector in many respects, 
there are more than 45 000 workplaces (exclud-
ing the hundreds of thousands of producers who 
use casual and family labour, which is entirely 
unregulated). In essence, this means that work-
ing conditions are regulated not by law but by 
the interests of the landowner.
A minimum wage regime for farm workers was 
implemented in 2003, with the combined effects 
of raising average wages significantly in some ar-
eas (although still well below the national aver-
age in all sectors) and feeding into the structural 
pressures to reduce the number of farm work-
ers. The minimum wage currently stands at R1 
232 per month for permanent workers, but lack 
of monitoring capacity also bedevils enforce-
ment. The consequence is a long-term decline in 
payment in kind and its ostensible monetisation, 
and very limited (if any) improvement in wages. 
National statistics on farm wages are very weak. 
They are gathered too seldom, they do not dis-
aggregate enough, and they rely on voluntary 
returns for their information. The latest Agricul-
tural Census (Stats SA 2009) shows that full-time 
workers earned an average wage of R1 384.83 
per month in 2007. This was down from R1 500.32 
in 2005 (Stats SA 2006). The figures include 
managers and other white-collar workers; thus, 
full-time blue-collar workers earn less than the 
average, and often amounts not very different 
from the wages of casual and seasonal workers. 
Casual and seasonal workers earned an average 
of R328.15 per month from farm work in 2007, 
compared with R354.56 per month in 2005. The 
issue is not so much about the decline between 
the years (since this might be due to short-term 
variables) as it is about the still extremely low 
wages farm workers received at a time when the 
agricultural sector was making huge profits. It 
is clear that commercial farmers have been able 
to ensure that wages remain depressed even in 
times of economic growth.
The minimum wages were coupled with the 
Extension of Security of Tenure Act 62 of 1997 
(ESTA) and the Land Reform (Labour Tenants) 
Act 3 of 1996, which ostensibly aimed to protect 
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farm dwellers’ tenure security rights, but in reali-
ty have permitted farmers to continue with farm 
worker evictions and retrenchments for opera-
tional reasons, as part of the broader structural 
changes brought about by the deregulated and 
liberalised environment. Between 1994 and 2004, 
2.35 million people were displaced from farms in 
South Africa, of which close to a million were 
evicted. Only 1% of those evictions involved a le-
gal process (Wegerif, Russell & Grundling 2005). 
The laws themselves have been rolled back in 
recent years: ESTA officer posts in provincial and 
district land reform offices have been disestab-
lished, leaving no dedicated staff function on 
tenure; tenure does not have its own dedicated 
budget line; the legal right ESTA establishes for 
funds to be made available for the purchase of 
land by farm dwellers is reduced to a right to 
access the land redistribution grant (Shirinda & 
Hall 2008). It is possible that the evictions com-
ponent of ESTA will be transferred to a revised 
version of the Prevention of Illegal Evictions and 
Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998. The 
key challenge will be how to extend and realise 
the material benefits suggested in ESTA in rela-
tion to tenure security for farm dwellers.
An important trend that started before the in-
troduction of the labour laws, and which also 
became an unintended consequence of ESTA 
and minimum-wage legislation, was the gradu-
al movement of farm labour off the farms and 
into rural and sometimes urban informal set-
tlements. Seasonal workers used to live on the 
farms while they worked, but increasingly they 
are transported daily onto farms and then taken 
back to where they live at the end of the day. 
Even permanent workers are not immune to this 
trend, with an increasing proportion of perma-
nent workers living off farms and commuting to 
work every day. This was part of the process of 
modernisation of labour relations. As work op-
portunities fragmented and work became more 
precarious across all sectors of the economy, the 
identity of being a farm worker also fragmented. 
Farm work became one of a range of livelihoods 
strategies that rural or marginalised urban citi-
zens adopted to make ends meet. Workers were 
forced to diversify their own livelihood activities, 
and this fitted neatly into the modernisation 
paradigm that sought to make the agricultural 
labour market more flexible.
The shift to off-farm labour occurred in paral-
lel with the rise of labour brokers in supplying 
workers to agriculture (Kritzinger, Barrientos & 
Rossouw 2004). Banning labour brokers is cur-
rently being proposed by the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) as a response to 
the rise of unregulated conditions for workers. 
However, it does not appear that the social force 
exists, either in the state or in civil society, to en-
sure that the conditions and payment of workers 
who are provided through labour brokers, pre-
sumably in terms of temporary contracts with 
the main employer, are improved in a sustained 
way. The unions (or any other organisations, for 
that matter) do not have enough strength to en-
force labour legislation that gives them the right 
to organise workers anywhere in the economy. 
This is what allows labour brokers to create no-
go areas for the unions. The problem is less one 
of labour broking as a form of providing em-
ployment, than of the weakness of workers to 
organise themselves to defend their interests. 
No amount of banning or laws will change this. 
It is a fundamental problem of organisation. This 
general weakness of grassroots organisation is 
recognised by the party-state in the Polokwane 
resolution on rural development, land reform 
and agrarian change: ‘critically, weak organisa-
tion of farm-workers deprives them of a voice 
and of the ability to take advantage of the rights 
provided under the Constitution and labour 
laws’ (ANC 2007).
Women farm dwellers have borne the brunt of 
the restructuring process (for a recent example, 
see Horne 2009). This is particularly as a result of 
the loss of full-time employment, and the shift 
into insecure seasonal work. Other burdens have 
been placed more firmly on the shoulders of 
women farm dwellers. Mainly women pension 
earners have had to shoulder the responsibility 
of sponsoring unemployed households. The lack 
of money to pay for electricity and water servic-
es has meant that women on farms have had to 
spend more time gathering wood to make fires 
and collecting water. Historically, women have 
performed these tasks. Therefore, the burden of 
the greater poverty and lower service levels falls 
disproportionately on the women. These obser-
vations are old and well known, but the situa-
tion has not changed in the past 15 years.
Recent statements of intent in the CRDP and in 
resolutions of the alliance partners have placed 
emphasis on the unionisation of farm workers 
and improved provision of services, including 
housing, water and electricity, by the state on 
privately owned land. These are very important 
interventions, if they are to happen. They have 
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the potential to create an organisational and 
material base for an alternative conception of 
agricultural production to emerge from inside 
the commercial farming areas, even if we cur-
rently are a long way from that. It would help 
if FAWU, in particular, were to orient itself to-
wards closing the gap between itself and other 
farm worker unions with capacity to mobilise 
their members, as well as NGOs and other CSOs 
working with farm workers, so that a broader 
front could be established. While the CRDP 
promises access to legal representation for farm 
workers facing eviction, it limits this to ‘illegal 
evictions’ (MRDLR 2009), which backtracks from 
heeding the call raised by CSOs for a moratori-
um on all evictions. This is plainly inadequate, as 
farm dwellers need legal representation in cases 
of legalised evictions. A more proactive stance is 
required from the state to deal with illegal evic-
tions when these are reported to it.
Given the above, it can hardly be said that the 
extension of labour and tenure security legisla-
tion to farm workers has started the process of 
‘internalising’ the costs of labour. The low levels 
stipulated in the minimum wages and the accept-
ance of evictions for economic reasons place the 
load of super-exploitation and the externalisa-
tion of labour costs on farm workers themselves, 
their communities and the state (which ‘tops 
up’ the deficit with welfarist provisions of vari-
ous types). COSATU’s demand for ‘decent work’ 
resonates here. At the same time, we must ac-
knowledge that agriculture as we know it today 
cannot survive without the super-exploitation of 
workers. Therefore, again, the immediate chal-
lenge is to begin, both practically and intellec-
tually, to identify alternative paths along which 
agriculture can be restructured to internalise the 
ecological and social costs generated by the sys-
tem, so that some do not continue to gain at the 
expense of others.
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5 Finance, R&D, training 
and extension
Financing agriculture
Under apartheid, access to credit was mediated 
through parastatal structures that enabled farm-
ers to borrow money from the government at 
interest rates that were lower than market rates. 
This primarily involved the Land Bank, the Ag-
ricultural Credit Board (ACB) and the co-opera-
tives. The latter held members’ crops in lien to 
cover the costs of input loans provided to them 
earlier in the season. This system functioned be-
cause the co-operatives had a near monopoly 
over storage and handling of most crops. Inter-
nal inefficiencies eventually made the scheme 
too expensive for the government and encour-
aged farmers to take on debt even when they 
should not have done so. For good or bad, it 
kept many farmers on the land who otherwise 
would have gone bankrupt.
Deregulation has established the basic expecta-
tion that farmers, regardless of what resources 
they have or the size of their farms, should be 
able to raise both capital and production loans 
at market-related interest rates, and be able to 
pay them back. Deregulation began in the mid-
1980s, although it was only around 2000 that 
the commercial banks really started outstrip-
ping the Land Bank in loans to farmers. Figure 
6 shows the rapid expansion of debts owed to 
commercial banks and the decline in debts owed 
to the Land Bank. By 2008, indebtedness to the 
Land Bank was just 11% of indebtedness to com-
mercial banks, compared with 93% just a decade 
earlier. There are two fundamental challenges 
with this in South Africa at present: access to 
credit for resource-poor farmers; and ability to 
repay loans.
The government has tried to improve access 
to credit by retaining or creating new insti-
tutions to provide credit, and by encouraging 
the private sector to extend loans to resource-
poor or black farmers. The Land Bank was 
supposed to have played an important role 
in providing finance, but not on the same 
basis as in the past. The Land and Agricultural 
Figure 6: Farming debt by lending entity, 1990–2008
Source: NDA (2009b)
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Development Bank Act 15 of 2002 changed 
the status and role of the bank, and since it 
subsequently had to raise its own funds on 
the money market, it could no longer subsi-
dise interest rates. The bank has been poorly 
managed for some time. In 2005, three top 
officials, including CEO Alan Mukoki, were 
suspended partly because of an R800 million 
loan made to Pamodzi Investment Holdings 
(with ANC heavyweights Kgalema Motlan-
the and Manne Dipico as shareholders) to 
purchase 49% of Foodcorp. The loan was a 
non-agricultural investment, which is not in 
conformity with the bank’s mandate. It also 
amounted to 33% of the institution’s total 
R2.4 billion capital base at the time (Business 
Day 02.04.07). Jurisdiction over the Land Bank 
was transferred from DAFF to the Ministry of 
Finance in July 2008. However, new allega-
tions of corruption, including R560 million 
spent on golf estates and residential property 
developments for connected individuals, and 
a R140 million expenditure on IT upgrading 
contrary to expert advice, suggest that, as 
ANC MP Salam Abram said, ‘The Land Bank is 
seen as a place where one can get in and start 
looting…Here are millions being looted’ (So-
mali Press 12.07.09). Contrary to the Act and 
the bank’s ‘self-financing’ status, the bank 
remains afloat only because of large central 
government grants, including a recent R4.5 
billion bailout. While this led to the bank’s 
fortunes improving, it did not have the same 
effect on farmers, many of whom were forced 
to cough up on loans they were battling to 
pay off (Africa Files 2009). The DRDLR will 
take over mortgage and production loans un-
der distress, renegotiate and restructure the 
loans and lease the farms back to the affected 
farmers for a period. If the farmers fail even 
after receiving appropriate support, the farms 
will be given to other farmers. The strategy 
will be widened to include all farms that re-
ceive Land Bank loans. In recent times, there 
have been suggestions that the government 
must rethink the Land Bank model so that it 
becomes the ‘real developmental bank it was 
always meant to be’. There have also been 
some suggestions that the ACB should be 
revived to support the ailing farming sector 
(DAFF 2009a). The few statements explaining 
what a ‘developmental bank’ would do dif-
ferently emphasise going beyond financial ac-
tivities into the realm of strategic advice and 
policy support (DAFF 2009b).
Overall, government support to emerging farm-
ers for finance has been very poor. The Mafisa 
programme was launched in 2006/07 to provide 
micro and retail agricultural financial services, 
and to facilitate access to public sector pro-
grammes. The programme ran into problems 
early on. The number of people benefiting 
from loans from Mafisa dwindled to only 150 
in 2008/09 but was expected to take off again 
and reach 15 000 in 2011/12 (National Treasury 
2009b). Halfway through the 2009/10 year, the 
programme had provided loans to only 5.7% of 
the planned 7 000 loan recipients, although it 
was suggested that farmers generally apply for 
loans later in the year and that the target would 
be reached (National Treasury 2009c). However, 
DAFF had also targeted 7 000 farmers to receive 
financial support in 2008/09, but only 49 farmers 
actually received assistance (NDA 2009a). Land 
Bank CE Phakamani Hadebe indicated corrup-
tion in the distribution of loans through Mafisa, 
with collusion in Limpopo between Land Bank 
officials and farmers. The latter got workers to 
unwittingly sign documents saying that they 
owned farms, then Land Bank officials disbursed 
loans to the farmers (Somali Press 2009). In 
partnership with Khula Enterprise Finance, the 
Khula-Mafisa Fund was established in 2008. The 
fund provided loans to a maximum of R300 000, 
with one-third covered by the fund and the re-
mainder covered by other financial institutions 
(which were guaranteed by the fund).
The aim of the fund is to accredit 12 financial 
institutions to participate in the programme by 
2009/10. However, funding for the programme is 
set to be discontinued at the end of this financial 
year. Mafisa intermediaries include the National 
Emergent Red Meat Producers’ Organisation, 
MGK Operating Company, Kaap Agri, Gauteng 
Enterprise Propeller, Eastern Cape Rural Finance 
Corporation (Uvimba Finance) and Peulwana Fi-
nancial Services. Applications and accreditations 
were underway at the end of 2008/09 for the 
Mpumalanga Agricultural Development Cor-
poration, Hlanganani Farming Finance, Ithala 
and South African Sugar Association. Uvimba 
Finance received R65 million from the National 
Department of Agriculture in 2008/09. The pro-
vincial department decided to reduce payments 
to Uvimba, since it was found that the funds sat 
in Uvimba’s account gathering interest but were 
reflected as expenditure on the department’s 
books. The resources were transferred to the 
procurement of goods and services in the pro-
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vincial department instead (National Treasury 
2009d).
The government’s response to the inability of 
farmers to repay loans correctly emphasises 
proper support and mentorship to enable 
farmers to become financially self-sufficient. 
As we have seen, a model is being proposed 
whereby government-owned farms are leased 
to new entrants for a time to identify who will 
ultimately receive farms. The theory is that the 
government will provide adequate production 
support during this time.
R&D, training and extension
South Africa’s National Agricultural Research 
System (NARS) is based on parastatals and sci-
ence councils, higher education and develop-
ment institutions and the private sector. The 
most significant institution funded by DAFF is 
the Agricultural Research Council (ARC), which 
received R515 million from DAFF in 2009. Gov-
ernment funding of the ARC has risen quite 
substantially in real terms (after taking infla-
tion into account), increasing almost threefold 
between 2002/03 and 2009/10 (ARC 2009). The 
National Students’ Financial Aid Scheme receives 
just R5 million a year. The Universities of Stellen-
bosch, Fort Hare and Free State received grants 
for agricultural programmes in 2008/09. There 
are 11 agricultural colleges, six universities of 
technology and nine universities that offer na-
tionally accredited agricultural education and 
training (AET) programmes. Secondary AET is 
offered by 1 500 schools. Other organisations of-
fer training that is not accredited (NDA 2005b). 
Agriculture has been withdrawn as a subject at 
primary school level, and high schools are poorly 
equipped in trained teachers and equipment. 
Low student numbers at agricultural colleges 
have meant a shift from the training of exten-
sion officers to the training of farmers directly.
The government’s strategic plan for 2009–2014 
indicates that dedicated resources will be put 
aside to recapitalise agricultural training col-
leges. This is to be funded through conditional 
grants from DAFF, with R50 million budgeted 
for 2011/12. All farmers and households that re-
ceive agricultural support from the state will 
also be given at least one opportunity to receive 
training or mentoring by 2014 (NPC 2009). Un-
der the Sector Services programme, DAFF pro-
vided training, research and extension support 
to 4 658 black entrepreneurs in 2008/09 (NDA 
2009a). The Agricultural Sector Education and 
Training Authority (AgriSETA) was established 
to provide work-based functional training in ag-
riculture. SETAs in all sectors are funded through 
a skills levy on all employers. However, smaller 
firms are exempted and in the agricultural sector 
this translates into 90% of all employers (AgriSE-
TA 2007). The AgriSETA is flooded with requests 
for training assistance, not only from farm work-
ers but also from land reform beneficiaries who 
have nowhere else to turn. In 2006/07, the SETA 
received 16 245 applications for learnerships, of 
which just 400 were approved, and 59 000 ap-
plications for skills programmes, of which just 
475 were approved (AgriSETA 2007). The SETA 
system is currently under review and is expected 
to change in the near future.
The 2007 agricultural research and development 
strategy identifies a long list of weaknesses in 
the NARS as it exists, focusing on poor co-ordi-
nation and linkages, and limited resources and 
capacity (NDA 2005b). The interface between 
researchers and farmers is tenuous and needs to 
be strengthened. This relates to the role of ex-
tension officers and how they potentially form 
a link between the research environment and 
producers. Research into agriculture should also 
become more interdisciplinary (Ainslie & Hassan 
2007). At present, there is no national agricultur-
al research agenda to speak of. While the ARC 
receives some resources from the state, there is a 
heavy reliance on generating income from con-
sultancies, which means that the agenda is both 
fragmented and set by those who can pay for 
it. Around 38% of ARC’s budget comes from ex-
ternal sources, and it is expected to remain that 
way at least in the medium term (ARC 2009).
At the level of primary research, biotechnology 
has been identified as a key growth area for the 
economy. The industry remains small in South 
Africa, valued at just R1 billion in 2007. Human 
health is by far the largest sector, followed by 
industrial applications and only then by plant 
biotechnology (Pouris 2003). Private sector in-
vestment in biotechnology remains low in South 
Africa, contributing around 10% of R&D expend-
iture in biotechnology in 2001. Consequently, it 
has been left to the public sector to drive the de-
velopment of biotechnology. Public-private-aca-
demic partnerships are central to the vision. The 
strategic focus is to stimulate the development 
and application of third-generation (recom-
binant DNA) technologies.6 This relates closely 
6  Biotechnology has devel-
oped through three major 
phases. The first generation 
largely involves the use of 
selected biological organisms to 
produce food and drink (such 
as cheese, beer and yeast). The 
main cluster of techniques in 
this generation is fermentation, 
plant and animal breeding 
and the clonal propagation of 
plants. The second generation 
entails the use of pure cell 
or tissue culture to yield new 
products. This generation is 
associated with the production 
of metabolites such as antibi-
otics, enzymes and vitamins. 
The third generation, modern 
biotechnology, is associated 
with recombinant deoxyribo-
nucleic acid (DNA) technology. 
It involves the ‘application of 
in vitro nucleic acid techniques, 
including recombinant DNA 
and direct injection of nucleic 
acid into cells or organelles’. In 
agriculture the application of 
recombinant DNA technology 
has focused on the genetic 
improvement of crops (DACST 
2001: 1).
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to the adoption of GM seed, which, although it 
is presented as having great benefits for small-
holder farmers, is used overwhelmingly by large-
scale commercial farmers in South Africa and 
globally. All GM technologies used commercially 
in South African agriculture are imported, and 
the government has identified this as a point for 
R&D. To this end, the ARC, the Council for Scien-
tific and Industrial Research (CSIR) and various 
universities are involved in primary research to 
develop homegrown genetic modifications.
The extension service is the interface between 
agricultural research and farmers. South Africa’s 
public extension service has been in gradual 
decline over the past 15 to 20 years, as DAFF’s 
resources have shrunk and extension for com-
mercial farmers has been privatised. The priva-
tisation process was stimulated by new thinking 
in extension, which proposed that extension 
workers should be responsive to their constitu-
encies. Under apartheid, but also under similar 
extension services around the world, extension 
was seen as a transfer of knowledge from ex-
perts to farmers in a one-way process. Extension 
targeted crops instead of people. A shift from 
these concepts is sound in principle. However, 
under a neo-liberal framework of thinking, the 
extension service was quickly converted into a 
monetised relationship, which entails the per-
son receiving payment being accountable to the 
person making payment, but which fails to re-
spond to those who need the services and can-
not pay. What is the value attached to providing 
appropriate extension services to resource-poor 
farmers? This question gets to the heart of the 
debate about who should be the ‘target’ of lim-
ited state support. The public extension service 
probably cannot meet the specialised needs of 
large-scale commercial farmers, and these farm-
ers are in a position to pay for their technical 
support needs. It, therefore, makes sense that 
extension to these farmers should be privatised. 
This then allows the public service to focus its at-
tention on resource-poor farmers, which is what 
has happened in South Africa. Nevertheless, the 
public extension service was severely run down 
over the past 15 years as agricultural budgets 
were tightened. The extension officers that have 
remained are poorly trained, and the type of 
service provided is still the top-down, one-way 
provision of often inappropriate information.
In 2008, there were 2 152 agricultural extension 
officers in South Africa, almost 60% of whom 
were in the former homelands areas of the East-
ern Cape and Limpopo (Mankazana 2008). Com-
parative statistics on the number of extension 
officers in each province are not publicly avail-
able.7 Nevertheless, a definite trend is apparent, 
with staff numbers dropping fairly rapidly be-
tween 2006 and 2009, and then rising slightly, 
with the expectation that they will remain static 
in the medium term (until 2012). In the Eastern 
Cape, for example, the plan is to increase the 
number of farmers reached by extension services 
sevenfold in 2009/10, from 8 000 in the previ-
ous year to more than 62 000 (National Treasury 
2009d), but the Farmer Support and Develop-
ment Programme of the provincial department 
is not planning to increase its staff numbers 
(National Treasury 2009d). This does not sit well 
with DAFF’s Extension Recovery Plan, which is 
being funded through CASP and has the stated 
aim of reviving public extension services. The 
plan involves adding an additional 1 000 exten-
sion officers over the Medium-term Expenditure 
Framework to 2011, retraining and reorienting 
2 000 existing extension workers, and providing 
them with the necessary infrastructure, includ-
ing information and communication technology. 
A total of R100 million was granted to provinces 
by DAFF in 2008/09 for the Extension Recov-
ery Plan, with 61% of this going to the Eastern 
Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Limpopo and North West 
(Mankazana 2008). Of this, less than half was 
spent by November 2008 (two-thirds of the way 
through the financial year).
The ratio of extension officers to farmers is 1:878, 
which is comparable with other countries with 
similar agricultural issues, such as India, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe (NDA 2005b). DAFF feels that 
the size of the workforce is less of an issue than 
the education and training of extension staff 
(NDA 2005b). However, we should try to envis-
age a single extension officer, sitting in a poorly 
equipped office (often without a computer or 
even electricity), with a limited budget to travel 
out to farms, having to respond to the support 
requirements of an average of 21 commercial 
farmers and 857 small-scale/subsistence farmers. 
How often are these farmers actually going to 
get the support they need? Are extension offic-
ers going to be able to provide appropriate sup-
port, given that they must support large-scale 
commercial farmers, commercial smallholders 
and subsistence farmers? To a large extent, ex-
tension services are the eyes and ears of DAFF 
on the ground. Extension workers should be 
able to identify producers with potential who 
7 Provinces have structured agri-
culture differently according to 
their own circumstances. Some 
provinces, like Gauteng and 
KwaZulu-Natal, have incorpo-
rated agriculture with conser-
vation and the environment. 
Reporting on staff numbers is 
per programme, and for these 
provinces, agriculture is a pro-
gramme. Others, such as Mpu-
malanga’s Department of Ag-
riculture and Land Administra-
tion, do not even break down 
staffing numbers into different 
programmes. For yet other 
provinces, such as the Free State 
and Limpopo, agriculture is a 
department on its own, so staff-
ing numbers are broken down 
further into Farmer Support 
Services, which incorporates ex-
tension services, but figures are 
not broken down further than 
the programme level, so it is 
not possible to determine how 
many staff members are exten-
sion workers.
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require support in accessing more land and a 
different level of support. Extension officers 
should be able to meet regularly with farmers to 
build meaningful relationships. Skills need to be 
broad enough to encompass technical support, 
organisational development, conflict resolution, 
financial planning, community-based planning 
and general development planning. One pillar 
of the recovery plan is the retraining and reori-
entation of extension personnel, including the 
provision of bursaries to upgrade skills, enroll-
ing personnel in ‘competence-based skills pro-
grammes’, and designing and facilitating the 
implementation of compulsory education and 
training programmes for extension advisors, sub-
ject specialists and managers (Mankazana 2008). 
The content of this is not yet clear. Although a 
total of 1 721 staff members were identified for 
skills upgrading, just 123 enrolled in 2008/09 
(Mankazana 2008).
The CRDP proposes using community develop-
ment workers (CDWs) to carry out rural develop-
ment plans generally, primarily as an interface 
between the government and the public, but 
these are usually people with limited experience 
of organisational dynamics, little knowledge of 
technical agricultural issues and weak conflict 
resolution skills. Without a doubt, opportuni-
ties should be given to youth to enter into these 
kinds of roles and to learn from experience, but 
dropping them in the deep end without ongoing 
mentoring and support from more experienced 
practitioners, and without some programme of 
formal training over time, is to do both them 
and farmers an injustice. While non-specialist 
CDWs may be an answer in some circumstances, 
a cadre of specialised development workers is 
needed to provide support to farmers and their 
local organisations. The concept of community-
based extension workers and community-based 
animal health workers has been piloted in recent 
years in South Africa and elsewhere in Africa (see 
Khanya-aicdd 2007). It is similar to home-based 
care workers who function to vastly extend the 
reach of health care services, but who are linked 
into the formal delivery system. The approach 
draws on members of the public, with appropri-
ate training, remuneration and technical back-
up, to act as auxiliaries to the formal system. 
Existing extension officers are then retooled to 
play a greater co-ordination and technical sup-
port role without having to go to every single 
farm themselves. The model conserves resources, 
engages communities in their own development, 
transfers skills, and has a far higher likelihood of 
success than trying to do everything with the ex-
isting extension service.
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6 Value adding and markets
Liberalisation and deregulation removed the 
state from direct intervention in almost all 
downstream activities in South Africa. Market 
forces increasingly determined the development 
of the value-adding sections of the agricultural 
economy. This ceding of the development path 
to the private sector has resulted in concentra-
tion all along the chain, as well as inefficiencies 
in resource use, most notably in transportation 
of agricultural produce. Seventy per cent of 
grain is now transported by road instead of rail, 
despite the latter being ecologically sounder 
and probably cheaper. In 1995, ‘white’ co-opera-
tives had an asset value of R15.2 billion, with the 
top eight accounting for 45% of this total (CPTT 
1997). By the mid-1990s, the co-operatives were 
handling the vast majority of many of the most 
important crops and supplying or financing ma-
jor levels of input to farmers (Bayley 2000). Many 
of them were converted into private companies 
following amendments to the Co-operatives 
Act in 1993. For example, wheat producers and 
millers, co-operatively organised into Sasko and 
Bokomo, merged under the umbrella of Pioneer 
Foods, and held one-third of the wheat flour 
market in the late 1990s. Although small millers 
have increased in number, the four biggest mill-
ers accounted for 87% of the market between 
them in 2004 (FPMC 2004). By 2002, three silo 
owners owned 70.3% of all storage facilities 
(FPMC 2004). Afgri, which emerged from the 
privatised Oos-Transvaal Ko-op, claimed a 30% 
market share of handling and storage capacity 
in South Africa in 2009 (Afgri 2009). The priva-
tisation of the large co-operatives, encouraged 
by the policy changes, led to increasing concen-
tration of marketing power in the likes of Af-
gri, Distel, Capespan (a privatised merger of the 
former citrus and deciduous fruit co-operatives) 
and others. Between them, Senwes, Afgri and 
Noordwes (privatised former co-operative agri-
businesses) owned more than 70% of domestic 
grain storage facilities, and the top four maize 
millers controlled 73% of the milling market in 
2004 (FPMC 2004:148-49). The dairy sector has 
witnessed a decline in the number of primary 
producers and producer-distributors and an in-
crease in the average size of dairy farms, proc-
essors and retailers since deregulation (FPMC 
2004). The top ten food-manufacturing compa-
nies accounted for 70% of the sector’s turnover 
in the mid-2000s (Madima 2006).
Domestic marketing, pricing and distribution 
are all under the sway of ‘free’ markets, with 
limited government intervention except to 
stop abuse of dominant market positions, 
which, as recent Competition Commission and 
National Agricultural Marketing Council (NAMC) 
investigations have shown, are becoming 
increasingly common as concentration in the 
value chain intensifies. In recent times, collusion 
or unfair dominance have been found in the 
input (fertiliser), storage, manufacturing and 
retail nodes of the chain (see Competition 
Commission 2009a on fertiliser collusion; 
Competition Commission 2009b on bread price 
fixing; Competition Commission and Senwes 
2009 on storage; NAMC 2009a on the retail sector 
exerting dominance). The NAMC (2009b) found 
that the sharp rise in bread prices in 2008 was 
‘subject to economic fundamentals governing 
international markets’. While we might be 
relieved that it was not the result of collusion 
or monopoly pricing in South Africa, we are 
faced with the far bigger problem of the price 
rise being a structural feature of contemporary 
capitalism. The Commission plays an important 
defensive role in challenging market dominance, 
but collusion and market dominance have to be 
very blatant before the Commission can take 
action. 
For smallholders, phasing out controls and clos-
ing marketing boards led to a shortage of essen-
tial services formerly provided by the boards and 
co-operatives, such as storage, grading, deliver-
ies, value adding, information dissemination and 
research. Small-scale African commercial farmers 
reported a range of problems with marketing, 
including lack of transport or the expense of 
hired transport; lack of assemblage and storage 
facilities in rural areas; poor road infrastructure; 
and lack of market information (NAMC 1998). 
Most of these services were privatised and have 
fallen under the control of the larger commercial 
interests. Smallholders lack bargaining power 
and their produce is often discriminated against, 
regardless of quality (Jacobs 2008). The NAMC 
and DAFF provide some broad market informa-
tion, but the specialist intelligence gathering is 
left to the private sector, which requires direct 
payment for detailed market information.
Greater risk in commercial farming as a whole 
has meant fewer opportunities for new farm-
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ers to enter the sector, as many existing farm-
ers have shifted into other branches of produc-
tion and more viable production strategies, thus 
‘crowding out’ new entrants (Schirmer 2000). 
The market is saturated and even the estab-
lished commercial farming sector is experiencing 
a shake-out of less productive farmers and an in-
tensification of competition. Even where oppor-
tunities open up as a result of expanding export 
markets, access to these opportunities is only the 
first step in a process of ‘levelling the playing 
fields’. Individual farmers often may be unable 
to realise the necessary economies of scale that 
are a prerequisite for exports. Successful export-
ing also requires co-ordination, which, in turn, 
depends on information and effective participa-
tion in networks that are partly social in charac-
ter. Information required in a deregulated envi-
ronment becomes highly critical for success, but 
it is also far more difficult to obtain than under a 
regulated system (Bayley 2000). This includes the 
accurate and rapid transmission of consumer de-
mand to primary producers, without which it is 
difficult to compete effectively. An understand-
ing of the functioning of international markets, 
and knowing where to intervene require mar-
keting skills that few ‘emerging’ farmers possess, 
often placing them at the mercy of marketing 
agents.
The ANC’s Polokwane resolutions recognise that 
concentration and vertical integration in the 
value chain limit the space for smallholders to 
participate in the market. The ANC (2007) pro-
poses ‘to integrate smallholders into formal 
value chains and link them with markets’. Co-
operatives are identified as a key organisational 
form to realise this. The AgriBEE framework 
does extend to beneficiation, storage, distribu-
tion and trading of agricultural commodities 
(NDA 2006a). This is important as far as it goes. 
However, the resolutions are neutral about the 
extent to which the co-operatives might be ori-
ented towards transforming the inherited mar-
ket economy, as opposed to merely enabling 
access to it. That means looking for opportuni-
ties for decommodification and building alter-
native channels for distribution that build up an 
economy based on solidarity and the meeting 
of essential needs. This is certain to emerge as a 
point of contestation over time as co-operatives 
are absorbed into the formal economy without 
having any real impact on its structure. It is part 
of a project of building up black-owned capital, 
but theoretically in the hands of ordinary citi-
zens rather than elites. At the same time, it will 
facilitate the rise of elites (or engender differ-
entiation amongst members, and potentially be-
tween members and non-organised parts of so-
ciety). This is not to say it is an incorrect strategy, 
but we need to see what the long-term trajec-
tory is and what implications this has for future 
organising by the rural poor. Can the rural poor 
use a co-operative strategy in a capitalist market 
context to strengthen their own resource base 
and organisation?
COSATU (2009: 27) calls for ‘agrarian and land 
reform on an anti-capitalist basis’, which ‘re-
quires a comprehensive industrial strategy that 
will promote agro-processing and democratic 
forms of production organisation’. Presumably, 
COSATU is referring to co-operative forms of 
production in agro-processing. As a first step to-
wards this, deconcentration of agro-processing, 
and shifting the location of processing activities 
into rural areas, has the potential to transform 
these areas into vibrant economies with social 
stability. However, this requires an encroach-
ment on the terrain of concentrated agribusi-
ness. The NAMC (2009b: 52) recommends that 
‘more efforts should go towards removing bar-
riers to entry and participation of smaller in-
dustry players in the food value chain so as to 
enhance competition’, including construction of 
small wheat mills around areas of production 
to constitute agro-industrial zones. This is one 
of the few explicit calls for the decentralisation 
of agro-processing into the rural areas, which is 
the way to go. In the same way as the discussion 
about the scale of agricultural production has 
developed, this suggests that smaller, decentral-
ised scales of agro-processing have transforma-
tive potential.
There is state sponsorship of large-scale process-
ing, where this is seen as potentially strategic at 
a macro level. Examples include the DTI’s Fruit 
Canning Initiative and the Rooibos Processing 
Plant in the Western Cape, and the Makhathini 
Sugar Processing Facility Project in KwaZulu-Na-
tal (DTI 2007a). The DTI has a number of other 
grants to support infrastructure development, 
to grow skills and even to assist foreign investors 
in bringing machinery and equipment to South 
Africa (Madima 2006). The Transformation and 
Entrepreneurial Scheme of the Industrial Devel-
opment Corporation (IDC) also supports some 
agro-processing, as do several provincial devel-
opment corporations. Other examples are the 
integration of smallholders into the production 
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tic production, whichever is cheapeer. The gov-
ernment’s basic approach to trade is a multilat-
eral rules-based trade regime where all parties 
are treated equally. For this reason, the govern-
ment is prepared to participate in and abide by 
multilateral agreements, even where these are 
sometimes patently unfair, as was the case with 
the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) in the Uru-
guay Round that established the World Trade 
Organisation (WTO). Much ink has been spilt on 
the way the United States (US) and European 
Union (EU), in particular, structured those rules 
in their favour, and subsequently transgressed 
them, knowing that the power imbalances were 
so large that none of the smaller countries could 
mount a significant challenge. When challenges 
were launched and even won, as in the case of 
Brazil taking the US to the dispute resolution 
mechanism in the WTO (see WTO 2004), the 
judgements were simply ignored. 
During that time, the South African govern-
ment vigorously pursued its obligations in terms 
of the AoA. Under the WTO agreements, South 
Africa simplified its tariff system and reduced 
the number of tariff levels to six. By 1998, 87.2% 
of tariff lines in agriculture were bound (WTO 
1998), and the system of duty-free quotas had 
been implemented. Agricultural tariffs gener-
ally fell between zero and 35% (with an aver-
age tariff of 5.6% in 1997). Citrus and deciduous 
fruit import tariffs stand at around 5%, with du-
ties on wine imports rising to 25%. Preferential 
agreements reduce some of these tariffs for part-
ners; thus, citrus and deciduous fruit from the 
EU has a tariff rate of 3.7% in accordance with 
the SA-EU free-trade agreement. South Africa 
also has regional and bilateral free-trade agree-
ments with its neighbours that establish com-
mon external tariffs and duty-free access inside 
the trade blocs. Between 2000 and 2003, South 
Africa had an average producer subsidy equiva-
lent8 of 5% (focused on sugarcane, followed by 
the sheep, milk and maize sectors), compared to 
31% for Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) countries.9 Sugarcane 
is protected by high import barriers and a pricing 
system that subsidises exports through boosting 
domestic prices (OECD 2006).
South Africa’s reduction of tariffs occurred far 
quicker than required by WTO obligations, show-
ing the government’s favour of open markets for 
most commodities and products. Applied tariffs 
are well below bound rates (i.e. tariff ceilings in 
accordance with the WTO), and this leaves a lot 
of biofuels, and large investments in commercial 
processing facilities. The IDC and Central Energy 
Fund, both South African parastatals, are core 
investors (ACB 2008). While these initiatives are 
aimed at increasing black ownership in down-
stream activities in the agricultural chain, the 
focus is on large-scale, commercial enterprises. 
There is limited support for small-scale, localised 
storage and processing facilities. DTI Minister 
Rob Davies (2009) has indicated that DAFF and 
the DTI are working on a comprehensive strat-
egy for agro-industries. Agriculture and agro-
processing are recognised as amongst the most 
labour-intensive industries, and an infrastruc-
ture programme will be developed that includes 
agro-processing. Apart from these comments, 
however, the National Industrial Policy Frame-
work has little to say about agro-processing or 
other downstream activities in the agricultural 
chain (DTI 2007b). Given that the DTI consid-
ers that ‘value adding and agro-processing will 
drive the sector’ by 2020 (Mankazana 2008: 6), 
current state plans for intervention are weak 
and incoherent.
It is worth considering that a possible long-term 
development is the increasing regionalisation of 
the agricultural value chain, with other central 
and southern African countries producing ag-
ricultural commodities, and South Africa, with 
its stronger manufacturing base, increasingly 
processing these commodities. Recent agree-
ments between the South African government, 
commercial farmers unions, agribusiness and 
governments in the region to settle commercial 
farmers in other countries reinforce this impres-
sion (see, for example, Hofstatter 2009b). Ac-
cording to DAFF, ‘a typical South African farmer 
will be diversified with interest beyond the bor-
ders of South Africa’ (Mankazana 2008: 6). This 
may be exporting a certain type of expertise and 
investment, but what anti-social practices are 
being exported along with those skills? What 
long-term benefits are there to those countries 
as they try to build up their own capacity to pro-
duce food for themselves and decrease reliance 
on imports? How does it advance a smallholder 
strategy regionally?
Trade policy has shifted fundamentally since the 
days of apartheid. The post-apartheid model is 
of a small, open economy that trades as freely as 
possible with the rest of the world. An important 
role of agriculture in this model is to export into 
niche markets and produce foreign exchange, 
with food security based on imports and domes-
8 The annual monetary trans-
fer to agricultural producers 
from domestic consumers 
and taxpayers resulting from 
agricultural policy, based on a 
complicated formula that takes 
into account level of produc-
tion, domestic producer price, 
world reference price, direct 
payments to producers, pro-
ducer levies and other budget 
payments to producers.
9 The OECD is an interna-
tional organisation of 30 of the 
wealthiest countries.
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10 ZAR3.654 to the US$ on 30 
June 1994 to ZAR6.668 to the 
US$ on 30 June 2005. The rand 
dropped to a historic low of 
ZAR13 to the US$ on 20 Decem-
ber 2001.
Figure 7: Domestic production versus imports of wheat by 
volume, 1997–2007
Source: NDA (2009b): http://faostat.fao.org
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of room for discretionary increases. Sugar, maize 
and wheat have variable duties that are trig-
gered by changes in world prices. Occasionally, 
the government has increased tariffs to protect 
local producers, some examples being tariff in-
creases on certain poultry products and on sugar 
(see Business Day 2002, 2004), but these increas-
es have remained within the broad framework 
of ‘free trade’ in agricultural products.
Devaluation of the rand is the outcome of a com-
bination of financial market liberalisation and a 
deliberate macroeconomic strategy to boost ex-
port earnings. Between mid-1994 and mid-2005, 
the rand lost 45% of its value to the US dollar 
(with sharp fluctuations in between).10 This has 
had contradictory effects. Export producers have 
benefited from sales in dollars and other strong 
currencies. Between 1985 and 1995, agricultural 
exports doubled in rand value, but between 1995 
and 2007 they grew by 3.5 times (NDA 2009b). 
Processed exports have risen faster than unproc-
essed exports, but there has been a simultane-
ous increase in the cost of imports as the rand 
has devalued over the years. These include an 
increase in the cost of covering shortfalls in ba-
sic food items, such as wheat and red meat for 
South Africa, which are valued in dollar terms. It 
also includes rising input costs for commodities 
such as machinery and plant and seed patents, 
also measured in dollar values. South Africa has 
retained a positive trade balance for unprocessed 
goods, rising above R5 billion in 2007 and 2008. 
Processed imports, however, have overtaken 
processed exports and the balance of trade for 
processed goods is negative and declining (Sher-
ry 2009). For small-scale farmers who are still try-
ing to get into the export market and are not yet 
earning dollars for their produce, the imported 
component of input costs has escalated dramati-
cally without a simultaneous rise in returns.
South African food imports rose substantially af-
ter trade liberalisation, with import penetration 
growing from 4.5% to 10.2% between 1993 and 
1996 (Holden 2001). Processors and retailers are 
both responsible for importing agricultural and 
food products. A generalised policy of import 
parity pricing has meant global commodity prices 
dictate what local producers receive for their pro-
duce, regardless of the actual cost of production. 
This has turned most farmers into price takers. 
The wheat sector is very instructive of the prob-
lems caused by open markets without regard for 
the protection of local producers. Wheat tariffs 
currently stand at 0% although the bound rates 
are 72%. Imported wheat, as a proportion of to-
tal volume consumed in South Africa, has risen 
steadily since deregulation, from 20% in 1997 to 
over 60% in 2007 (see Figure 7). Local production 
declined by 54% over the same period, from 1.38 
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billion tons to 683 million tons, clearly indicating 
that imported wheat has displaced local produc-
tion. Essentially, the imports are of lower-quali-
ty, cheaper wheat mainly from Argentina. Part 
of the problem is that Monsanto, a seed multi-
national, purchased South Africa’s wheat seed 
companies at the turn of the decade and then 
decided it was not profitable enough to invest in 
improving the varieties, complaining that farm-
ers were saving seed (Blom 2007). This is a very 
old practice, with 62% of all wheat planted in 
South Africa derived from farm-saved seed (Den 
Hartigh 2007). The NAMC recommends a reduc-
tion in the dependence on imported wheat and 
a move to self-sufficiency, linked to the adop-
tion of varieties with higher yields and improved 
quality, as well as a comprehensive support and 
incentive package (NAMC 2009b). How is this to 
come about if tariffs are not used to protect lo-
cal producers from cheap, poor-quality imports, 
and if wheat seed is the private property of a 
multinational that is not interested in improving 
varieties without making a profit for itself? The 
ARC could be tasked with working on appropri-
ate wheat varieties, keeping the germplasm in 
the public domain.
As for tariffs, the economic crisis and responses 
from governments around the world suggest 
that some flexibility is appropriate. Discussions 
are under way in South Africa. The Deputy Min-
ister of Trade and Industry recently suggested 
the possibility of raising tariffs to protect the 
economy during the global crisis. The Agricul-
ture CEO Forum is currently working with the 
DTI to review the Marketing of Agricultural 
Products Act 47 of 1996 and to develop tariff 
policy in South Africa (MAC 2009). On tariffs, 
a legal instrument is being developed that will 
provide for DAFF making recommendations on 
agricultural trade policy before approval and 
implementation by the International Trade and 
Administration Commission (ITAC). Since ITAC’s 
agricultural commissioner position is vacant, an 
official from DAFF will fill in (MAC 2009).
It is important to consider the long-term means 
by which marketing and trading can be trans-
formed to meet the needs of smallholder pro-
ducers and consumers, but we should keep in 
mind that the current focus remains more basic 
than that. In a 1997 survey of food producers in 
communal areas, water, finance, more land and 
training were the top four requests for assist-
ance; for the poorest households, land and wa-
ter topped the list (Stats SA 1997). This is not to 
say we should just forget about marketing and 
trade (in the way that we all forgot about agri-
cultural support in the early days of land reform, 
when transfer of land was the only important 
issue on the agenda), but the first practical step 
is ensuring that people have the resources to be 
able to produce.
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Agricultural 
multifunctionality
Food security
A major purpose of agriculture is to produce 
food. South Africa has shifted from a policy of 
food self-sufficiency to a policy of trade in food 
based on comparative advantage. In South Af-
rica, the production system can deliver enough 
food to meet the needs of everyone living in the 
country for the time being. Nevertheless, many 
people are still unable to access food, and ag-
ricultural reforms have not led to a significant 
improvement in food security. A 2004 study 
estimated that 1.5 million children in South Af-
rica were malnourished, 14 million people (35% 
of the population) were vulnerable to food in-
security, and 43% of South African households 
suffered from food poverty (HSRC 2004). Figure 
8 shows the per capita consumption of maize, 
wheat and vegetables (excluding potatoes) be-
tween 1985 and 2008.11 To date, there has been 
a decline in the average consumption of these 
three staple parts of the diet. Per capita con-
sumption of wheat has started increasing very 
slowly (although with stability) since 1999, but is 
Figure 8: Per capita consumption of maize, wheat and 
vegetables, 1985–2008
still below pre-1990s levels. Maize, meanwhile, 
shows greater volatility, especially since 1996. It 
is true that the downward trend in per capita 
consumption was broken, but current levels re-
main below pre-1990 levels. Per capita vegetable 
consumption has shown a constant downward 
trend since 1985. South Africans are consuming 
17% less wheat and 32% less vegetables than 
they were two decades ago on a per capita ba-
sis. The numbers also hide local and household 
inequalities, with wealthier households likely to 
be the main beneficiaries of any rise in consump-
tion.
In South Africa, food insecurity is a problem 
mainly of distribution and access. The govern-
ment has tried to respond to this by emphasis-
ing social protection in the form of social grants 
and (on a far smaller scale) by providing food 
aid in the form of food parcels and school feed-
ing schemes. Most of these interventions are car-
ried out by departments other than agriculture, 
notably the Department of Social Development 
and the Department of Health. These are impor-
11 This section is drawn from 
Greenberg (2009).
Source: NDA (2009b: 107) 
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time. Yet it does have the potential. This is an 
agenda that can be shared by the government 
and civil society, but it needs resources, and only 
small amounts are forthcoming. The current ap-
proach is to focus on what the government can 
do, without considering how to build links more 
broadly to encourage self-sufficiency. The extant 
model is that initiatives from the ground must 
be channelled into government programmes or 
the state will not provide resources.
Sen’s argument that self-production may be 
critical for food security for the poor in times 
of heightened food price volatility brings the 
structure of production into the picture, some-
thing that is untouched in the traditional defi-
nition of food security, which focuses entirely 
on consumption. While the concept of ‘food 
security’ does have as one key element the avail-
ability of food, it is silent on how this availabil-
ity comes about: it could be self-production as 
much as food aid. The concept of ‘food sover-
eignty’ suggests that the ability of a nation, or 
group of people, to feed themselves is an issue 
of fundamental security. Relying on unpredict-
able imports that are available only because of 
an unsustainable reliance on an oil-based and 
labour-exploiting economic system is an essen-
tial threat to that security (Rosset 2006). Food 
sovereignty is rooted in a rights-based approach 
to food and agriculture with the following 
key elements: the priority of local agricultural 
production to feed people locally; the right of 
countries to protect themselves from dumping 
of under-priced agricultural produce; the need 
for agricultural prices to be directly linked to 
production costs; and the mainstreaming of 
agro-ecological production that recognises food 
production, sustainable livelihoods, living land-
scapes and environmental integrity as integral 
to rural sustainability (Windfuhr & Jonsen 2005). 
This connects closely with a radical conception 
of the multifunctionality of agriculture, which 
understands agriculture to have many beneficial 
purposes, of which food production is but one. 
‘Radical multifunctionality’ confronts the global 
regulation of agricultural commodities in all cir-
cumstances, and links agricultural production 
directly to sustainable environmental govern-
ance. In order to realise this vision, proponents 
of food sovereignty make a connection between 
issues around agricultural production and trade, 
and broader issues of land and agrarian trans-
formation, especially in ‘developing’ countries. 
Transformation of power relations, access to 
tant interventions, and the grant system, in par-
ticular, has had a noticeable impact on lowering 
poverty levels (see Everatt et al. 2008). However, 
the interventions are welfarist in orientation and 
leave the existing social and economic system of 
producing food intact.
Amartya Sen (1981) argues that in times of 
sharp price rises or fluctuations (as at present), 
the ability to produce food can be more im-
portant than having money to buy food. This 
requires broadening the base of food produc-
ers who can sell into the local market and use 
food for their own consumption. Government 
programmes supporting the production of food 
gardens are expanding. In 2008/09, 80 000 
starter packs were distributed through the na-
tional Household Food Production Programme, 
which provides basic production inputs, includ-
ing seedlings, seed, fertiliser and pesticides. The 
Ilima/Letsema campaign was launched in 2008 in 
eight provinces to support the productive use of 
land wherever people have access to it, includ-
ing the so-called ‘dead’ land in the communal 
areas. Part of the campaign is to distribute agri-
cultural starter packs to poor households. Funds 
from the national programme are transferred to 
the provinces as conditional grants for specific 
production projects. Provincial programmes in-
clude Siyazondla and the Massive Food Produc-
tion Programme in the Eastern Cape, Letsema/
Kgora in the North West, and Xoshindlala in 
KwaZulu-Natal. The budget for the Ilima/Letse-
ma campaign is expected to rise fourfold in the 
medium term, to R400 million in 2011/12 (Nation-
al Treasury 2009b). There is a planned increase 
in the provision of agricultural starter packs to 
140 000 households per year, with the (very op-
timistic) goal of rural households meeting 60% 
of their food needs through own production by 
2014 (NPC 2009).
The provision of agricultural starter packs to 
households is an important initiative, although 
there are a few current weaknesses. Train-
ing is mostly once-off, and follow-up support 
is extremely limited. The campaign is also not 
systematically linked to identifying successful 
homestead producers who might benefit them-
selves and the country more broadly by being 
given the resources and opportunity to produce 
on a larger scale. Like the grants and food aid 
interventions, this gives the programme a fla-
vour of welfarism/poverty alleviation rather 
than of a strategically considered intervention 
that can lead to broader structural changes over 
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land, seed and water, and freedom to make pro-
duction decisions are all necessary elements of 
the realisation of a democratic, localised food 
system. The concept of food sovereignty brings 
to the fore issues of who produces, how and for 
whom. This gains even greater weight since it 
is accompanied by the mobilisation of peasant 
movements across the globe, driven through 
La Via Campesina. Elements of an alternative 
to the industrial capitalist agricultural path are 
scattered all over the landscape, here in South 
Africa as much as elsewhere, in agro-ecological 
practices underpinned by solidarity.
Productivist pathways in 
agriculture
As food sovereignty foregrounds, agriculture 
must be understood as an integrated economic, 
social, ecological and productive system. The no-
tion of the multifunctionality of agriculture has 
been highlighted in WTO negotiations in recent 
years. Tilzey (2006) identifies five broad posi-
tions on multifunctionality. He establishes this 
categorisation specifically in relation to trade ne-
gotiations, but the categories generally hold for 
a broader conceptual discussion on approaches 
to agriculture. The ‘transnational or radical neo-
liberal agenda’ (the first category) sees environ-
mental and social welfare issues as having noth-
ing to do with agriculture, and wants them sepa-
rated into the realm of ‘non-trade concerns’. The 
understanding of agriculture in this case is lim-
ited to the productive aspect alone, and the aim 
is to increase productivity at all costs, with the 
only issue for debate being how to deal with the 
‘negative externalities’12 caused by this produc-
tivist model. But this approach is also stunning 
for its assertion that trade on a global scale has 
no fundamental impact on social and ecological 
systems.
Tilzey’s second category, ‘embedded neoliberal-
ism’, recognises that agriculture can generate 
‘positive externalities’ (i.e. it can have positive 
effects beyond just producing food). Examples 
of positive externalities can include maintaining 
the countryside, rural traditions and communi-
ties, environmental protection and the fostering 
of biodiversity. The emphasis on positive exter-
nalities presumes that the production system in 
place at the moment necessarily engenders an 
overall positive configuration of social and envi-
ronmental conditions. But what is the character 
of the countryside that is reproduced by the cur-
rent agricultural practices? Agriculture in South 
Africa is based on the dispossession and super-
exploitation of the black population, which has 
created a much-damaged countryside. If the sys-
tem remains rooted in this base, the apartheid 
countryside will be reproduced. This seems more 
like a negative externality embedded in the ag-
ricultural system than a positive one. Rural tradi-
tions and communities are shaped by oppression 
and dispossession as well as by resistance and 
agency, which requires an understanding of the 
dynamics, contradictions and cohesions of those 
traditions and communities, and blending them 
into an understanding of the world. A just re-
sponse to past injustice requires the transforma-
tion of the cultural institutions of apartheid by 
undermining the legacy of oppression and dis-
possession, and simultaneously strengthening 
the legacy of resistance and agency. Despite rec-
ognising positive externalities, the ‘embedded 
neo-liberals’ argue that agriculture is only con-
tingently, rather than necessarily, required to 
generate these beneficial outcomes. This is non-
sensical, because agriculture is embedded in the 
rural and it is impossible to alter the rural while 
leaving agriculture untouched and vice-versa. 
Even in Europe, Australia and the US, where this 
argument is dominant, significant questions are 
posed about whether the current rural structure 
is really the best possible one. Some of these 
questions, and responses to them, are gener-
ated by active global peasant and small farmer 
movements.
The third group, ‘social democrats’ in Tilzey’s 
categorisation, calls for income support and re-
muneration for positive externalities, which are 
recognised as intrinsic to agriculture. It is not 
clear if anything is said about paying for nega-
tive externalities, and both lead down the path 
of quantifying externalities in monetary equiva-
lents.13 This is a power-laden and impossible task, 
since some effects cannot be reduced to money. 
The global drive to commodify natural resources 
(of which the monetisation of environmental ex-
ternalities is one component) is part of the main-
stream response to climate change and other 
ecological crises (oil, water, land, forests). In this, 
South African national law and policy reflects 
global discourse.
Tilzey proceeds to identify ‘neo-mercantilists’ as 
a fourth category. They call for the continuation 
of ‘political productivism’ (i.e. state intervention 
to underwrite productive capacity, the domestic 
market and export potential). Little is said about 
use of the surplus generated from productive 
12 Externalities are costs or ben-
efits for people who have not 
been involved in the decision 
leading to the benefit or cost.
13 There is an interesting 
equivalence between the mon-
etisation of externalities and 
the attempt in the land restitu-
tion programme to quantify 
the loss of the dispossessed. 
From a material point of view, 
monetisation is possible. What, 
however, of social structures, 
kinships, loss of place? How 
does society compensate, and 
which sections of society?
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Sustainable resource use and 
ecological modernisation
There is general agreement, including in South 
African policy, that sustainable use of natural 
resources is needed to realise food security for 
all. However, there is little agreement on what 
sustainable use is or how it is to be carried out. 
There is some consensus that sustainability can 
be taken to refer not only to financial sustain-
ability, but to social and ecological sustainability 
too (very closely related to the multifunctionality 
argument). But again, there is little agreement 
on the content of those terms. The popular slo-
gan being advanced from the United Nations is 
‘Profit, People, Planet’ as three components that 
are used as stand-ins for economic, social, eco-
logical. But note how the economic is reduced 
to profit. That is, the private appropriation of 
surplus wealth and along with it the decision-
making power of what to do with that surplus. 
Yes, the economic needs to be integrated into 
any response. But, noting the systemic damage 
generated by extraction of a surplus by a small 
elite over a long period of time, it is necessary to 
consider what other possible ways there are to 
build an economy that is not reliant on this pri-
vate surplus appropriation for its development. 
On the political left, there are some seeds of 
agreement regarding the importance of build-
ing the material and institutional platforms for 
an alternative in the present, of which the politi-
cal terrain - and the state in particular - is one.
In policy, the South African government is a sig-
natory to numerous environmental treaties that 
boil down to ‘Profit, People, Planet’ and retain 
that contradiction at their heart: contradiction 
because private appropriation of surplus and 
ecological and social sustainability are incom-
patible in the long term. The mainstream frame-
work translates into the notion of sustainable 
development and, theoretically, sustainable ag-
riculture too. Hence, a major objective of DAFF 
is sustainable resource use. Again, this is theory 
(or policy), since little in practice is being done 
to shift South African agriculture onto a sustain-
able path. The Environmental Impact Assess-
ment (EIA) process15 is part of the incorporation 
of ecology into development, where an assess-
ment of the impact on the environmental, social 
and economic situations must be undertaken by 
those who want to implement large-scale devel-
opment plans. Yet the approach is often one of 
formality, partly because of lack of regulatory 
capacity or how domestic and export markets 
are structured. The idea, therefore, is entirely 
compatible with a system that exploits natural 
resources and people for the chief benefit of a 
few. This is the one of Tilzey’s categories that is 
most bound up with the trade debate and multi-
functionality. The other categories refer to mul-
tifunctionality as an understanding of the role of 
agriculture, whereas ‘neo-mercantilism’ refers to 
a state response to agriculture, whatever its role. 
However, it emphasises the food and fibre (and 
fuel) producing aspect of agriculture as well as 
markets (i.e. the economic, productivist aspect). 
Tilzey’s final category is the ‘strong multifunc-
tionality’ group, which rejects the incorporation 
of agriculture into trade negotiations outright, 
asserting that agriculture cannot be reduced to 
the imperatives of trade. This approach is closely 
connected with the concept of ‘food sovereign-
ty’ discussed above, and attempts to deepen 
understanding of the inextricable link between 
social, economic and ecological systems that re-
quire radical transformation. Of all the catego-
ries, it is the only one not based on a productivist 
model of agriculture (i.e. the primary purpose of 
agriculture being to produce commodities at an 
ever-greater scale).
Different constituencies inside a country have 
differing approaches to these questions. All of 
the categories identified by Tilzey are present 
in South Africa. Neoliberal models of one type 
or another are favoured by agribusiness. While 
there is recognition of ecological dimensions, 
the response is largely laissez-faire within a 
broad framework constructed by the state. Agri-
business is left to monitor itself, and sustainabil-
ity reporting remains a voluntary activity (Timm 
2009). There is very little proactive enforcement 
by the state, which means that if companies and 
landowners do not do anything to attract at-
tention to themselves (even if there is environ-
mental damage), they can continue as they wish. 
Calls for ‘political productivism’ amongst sec-
tions of both black and white farmers are gain-
ing traction as the notion of an interventionist 
state gathers credence. The call for tariffs on 
categories of agricultural imports is an example 
of this,14 and sets fractions of land-based capital 
against fractions of industrial agribusiness and 
retailers in the dominant downstream parts of 
the chain. The state’s response to the imperative 
of building a black farming class is coloured by 
political productivism.
14 There has been a history of 
this, especially amongst white 
farmers who were being under-
cut by cheap imports of wheat, 
dairy and poultry, amongst 
others.
15 In terms of Sections 21, 
22 and 26 and associated 
regulations of the Environment 
Conservation Act 73 of 1989, 
supported by Sections 2(4)(i) 
and 24(7) of the National En-
vironmental Management Act 
No. 107 of 1998.
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capacity and partly because other priorities seem 
more urgent, in particular employment creation 
in a context of private surplus appropriation. 
Consultants hired to undertake EIAs, although 
chosen by the developer, must sign a Declara-
tion of Interest that they do not stand to gain 
materially from the success of the development. 
Nevertheless, this means that the developer can 
choose a consultant known to be in favour of 
big developments, which would skew the report 
in the developer’s favour. This can even hap-
pen purely through the methodology adopted, 
which determines who is asked what and how. It 
is unfeasible, given existing funding constraints, 
for DWEA to monitor and respond to these ac-
tivities adequately. As will be seen below in the 
case of water, existing practices are granted un-
challenged recognition. The EIA applies only to 
new developments, not to existing ones (i.e. the 
entire economy and its structure). It is not a tool 
that can challenge past industrial practices.
The LandCare programme focuses on the con-
servation of natural resources through capacity 
building for sustainable utilisation of these re-
sources. In South Africa, the programme has a 
job-creation objective as well (NDA 1999). In the 
context of the massive restructuring of the rural 
economy over the past 20 years, the programme 
is a drop in the ocean. DAFF sets itself a target 
of just 3 700 hectares per year over the medium 
term (the next 3 years) for land under sustain-
able land management. Through the LandCare 
programme in 2007/08, 4 664 beneficiaries re-
ceived support to protect 2 428 hectares of land 
and to improve the soil management systems 
implemented on 5 047 hectares of range land 
(National Treasury 2009b). In the provinces, R165 
million was spent on 178 LandCare projects.16 
Compare this with the 82 million hectares of 
farmland and 17 million hectares of potentially 
arable land (NDA 2009b),17 and it is clear that the 
programme is not a serious component of DAFF’s 
work. Given the small size of the programme, it 
must be concluded that it serves more as a pov-
erty-alleviation exercise than as a real attempt 
to alter land management systems and methods 
in an ecologically sustainable way. 
Conservation and ecological sustainability have 
become part of the mainstream discourse in rec-
ognition that ultimately ecological damage will 
have negative economic effects at a large enough 
scale for governments and corporations to take 
notice (i.e. it can potentially hurt their own in-
terests). The resulting ‘ecological modernisation’ 
seeks to ‘retrofit’ capitalism with environmental 
safeguards. However, seen through profit lens-
es, it places emphasis on efficiency, competitive-
ness, marketability (with regard to tourism and 
the ‘rural landscape’), flexibility and (capitalist) 
development ahead of maintaining and improv-
ing environmental integrity and coherence (Keil 
& Desfor 2003). Sustainability in South Africa is 
geared towards a corporatist model, in terms 
of which the state and business interests align 
their long-term strategies (see Timm 2009). This 
corporatist model has been developed in South 
Africa under the guise of the ‘developmental 
state’. Relationships between natural resources 
and society are defined primarily from the point 
of view of the survival of an economy in which 
private surplus appropriation is the norm. This 
approach is likely to be unsuccessful, not only 
because it is embedded in unsustainable modes 
of social regulation, but also because capitalism 
as a system generates environmental crises at its 
core.
The National Environmental Management Act 
107 of 1998 penalises anyone who damages the 
environment in the course of productive activi-
ties, but the penalisation is monetised, which 
tends towards the ‘embedded neoliberal’ and 
‘social democratic’ approaches, both of which 
seek to place a monetary value on externalities 
of agriculture. This commodification of rural 
life would be more advanced if DWEA actually 
were able to implement the Act to the letter. At 
the same time, if handled correctly, it could see 
a surge of money into rural areas, depending 
on who would receive payment when environ-
mental damage is incurred. The Act limits the re-
sponsibility of the person who has damaged the 
environment to the present and future, but not 
the past. According to Section 28(1) of the Act, 
‘Every person who causes, has caused or may 
cause significant pollution or degradation of the 
environment must take reasonable measures to 
prevent such pollution or degradation from oc-
curring, continuing or recurring, or, in so far as 
such harm to the environment is authorised by 
law or cannot reasonably be avoided or stopped, 
to minimise and rectify such pollution or degra-
dation of the environment’ (italics added). Thus, 
one may damage the environment, but if one 
is caught one must stop. One will have to pay 
the costs of reorganising activities so that they 
do not cause further damage; for the damage 
already done, there is no penalty.
16 Provincial agriculture 
budgets, 2009/10. Not all the 
information about the size of 
each project is immediately 
available. It would be neces-
sary to go to nine provincial 
departments to find that. It is 
reminiscent of the apartheid 
fragmentation of the public 
service into 10 bantustans and a 
‘core’ territory.
17 As identified in 1991, when a 
proper survey was last done.
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One possible reason why the law stops here is 
because industrial growth in South Africa is built 
on the externalisation of costs onto the environ-
ment, and the vision for its continued growth 
does not diverge from this path in its fundamen-
tals. It is questionable whether the industrial sec-
tor (including industrial agriculture) can repair 
the damage it has already caused to the environ-
ment and still survive as a profitable economic 
system. These negative externalities need to be 
balanced against other more positive aspects of 
the development of commercial agriculture. In 
particular, food security for all appears to be a 
physical possibility. It must be kept in mind that 
the definition of food security, and the recom-
mended daily nutrient intake to live an accept-
able life, are related to a particular standard of 
living, which, in turn, is related to urbanisation 
and an industrial economy. So the possibility that 
industrialising agriculture presents is located in a 
context of rapidly expanding populations, heavy 
corporate influence in food production, and de-
clining natural resources globally. The challenge 
is to consider what alternative forms of produc-
tion can be envisaged that do not rely on this 
externalisation of social and environmental costs 
in the first place; to think about practical steps 
that can be taken in the present, either to begin 
shifting us onto such an alternative path, or to 
create the preconditions for an alternative to be 
formed; and to identify what social forces are re-
quired or exist to realise this in practice.
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8 Reflections on the 
developmental state, BEE 
and agriculture
The developmental state
One of the major contemporary debates in 
South Africa is to what extent the state should 
be directly involved in economic activity. The de-
bate is emphatically not about whether the state 
should withdraw from the economy or not: in 
every country in the world, the state plays a criti-
cal role in regulating the economy and the en-
tire ‘social structure of accumulation’ in a given 
period and a given place. The social structure of 
accumulation refers to the relation between the 
economy and the political and social practices 
that accompany it and permit it to exist. There 
is no ‘necessary’ configuration of economy-
politics-society: any given configuration is his-
torically contingent and the product of ongoing 
contestation, compromise and the exertion of 
power not only by state actors but across society. 
So debating the removal of the state from the 
economy is irrelevant: this is widely recognised 
in the present global economic crisis, where 
states across the globe immediately came to the 
fore to manage the crisis and restructure rela-
tionships and regulatory systems. The debate 
is about where and how the state should inter-
vene, not whether it should.
In South Africa, the debate is currently viewed 
mainly through the prism of the ‘developmental 
state’. There is certainly no agreement on what 
this means: it has been used to justify crony cap-
italism and has been presented as the type of 
state that can prepare the ground for socialism. 
The concept of a developmental state emerged 
in South East Asia in the 1970s, where the state 
took a leading role in co-ordinating and chan-
nelling the individual activities of the private 
sector towards realising (politically determined) 
national priorities. There are two key views at 
the core of the developmental state. Firstly, the 
market does not work well in promoting in-
dustrialisation, especially in a global economy 
where some states already have mature indus-
trial sectors; therefore, it is appropriate for the 
state to intervene to distort market incentives to 
selectively build up industries that can become 
competitive. Secondly, the state needs to have 
the autonomy to implement the ‘right’ policies 
in the face of vested interests and of ‘populist’ 
pressure from the general population (Fine 
2007).18 In Asia, developmental states tended to 
be authoritarian, and their very success led to 
their downfall: on the one hand, the growing 
power of the conglomerates undermined the 
continued ability of the state to direct invest-
ment and economic activity; on the other hand, 
a movement for democratisation undermined 
state autonomy.
The concept of a ‘democratic developmental 
state’ was deployed in South Africa from the mid-
1990s, especially at local government level, with 
the idea that municipalities would actively inter-
vene to align the economic activities that were 
taking place in their areas of jurisdiction with 
political priorities (as spelled out in integrated 
development plans). However, this plan faltered 
as it became apparent that local councils did not 
have the resources, capacity or power to direct 
economic activity. Even in Johannesburg, where 
the metro is far more powerful than its rural 
counterparts, the municipality has struggled to 
align economic activity with political priorities. 
For example, while the municipality favoured in-
vestment in the south of the city, most private 
sector investment was directed to the north of 
the city centre.
South Africa has a highly statist political cul-
ture, where the state is perceived as the deliv-
erer, for good or bad. This comes from a long 
history of state-driven economic development 
under the National Party and even before it, as 
well as within the liberation movement, heavily 
coloured by Stalinist models of statist economic 
development. Capital had a very close relation-
ship with the state in the colonial and apart-
heid eras. It was only in the 1980s that fractions 
within the private sector began to rail against 
the state because the regulatory framework was 
becoming too costly for their profitability. Dis-
cursively, arguments against state dominance 
18 Fine juxtaposes these two 
views, but they can operate 
together.
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linked closely to the mainstream ideology of 
‘development’. The concept is nebulous, much 
like the ‘war on poverty’, and is taken to mean 
some kind of social and economic improvement 
for the majority. The approach banishes peo-
ple’s agency from politics and turns them into 
‘beneficiaries’ of the state (Shivji in Mngxitama 
2005: 63). This lack of specificity in defining the 
developmental state created room for a section 
of the ANC leadership to assert that building 
a black economic elite is a step on the road to 
social and economic improvement for all. This 
‘1996 class project’, as it later came to be called, 
is no more than the logic of the two-stage Na-
tional Democratic Revolution (NDR): first, build 
deracialised capitalist forces of production, then 
carry out a socialist transition. The first stage for 
the elites, the second stage for the workers. This 
is in line with the agenda of the new hegemon, 
the nascent black bourgeoisie, whose funda-
mental tasks were to secure a place for itself 
economically while simultaneously balancing 
the conflicting interests (in particular between 
white monopoly capital and African workers) 
within the historic bloc it had formed around 
its leadership. So far, it has convinced the other 
major social forces that their interests remain 
connected to the realisation of its own interests 
(the definition of hegemony). The left inside the 
alliance failed to see the limits of a cross-class al-
liance in which strategies based on independent 
organisation and representation of the working 
classes were subordinated to the leadership and 
strategies of the middle class. The combination 
of external constraints and internal contestation 
over class direction resulted in the dominance of 
a leadership group that sought to use the state 
to build a social base for itself amongst the mid-
dle and capitalist classes.
This political trajectory inflected discourse and 
practice on the developmental role of the state. 
Development was understood to be the realisa-
tion of the first stage of the NDR (i.e. building a 
black capitalist class that could deepen capitalist 
relations and forces of production), which ap-
parently would continue until the capitalist sys-
tem was exhausted in South Africa. The first ver-
sion of BEE enabled political elites to transform 
their political power into economic power. BEE 
is built precisely around the idea of redistribut-
ing wealth at the level of capital between white 
and black. This has a historical precedent in the 
way the National Party used the state to enable 
Afrikaner capital to share the wealth of English 
also had a resonance with a citizenry that keenly 
felt the administrative injustice of the state. This 
provided the seeds for a counter-hegemonic 
thrust – under the leadership of the nascent 
black middle class – that forged important frac-
tions of white monopoly capital and organised 
labour into a post-apartheid historic bloc. This 
was fraught, but compromises on the structure 
of the economy and the parameters of state in-
tervention were hammered out in negotiations. 
For the leadership of the liberation movement 
(which emerged as a leadership for the entire 
society in opposition to the apartheid state), 
an interventionist state was important, but the 
interventions needed to be switched from a ra-
cially exclusive basis to an inclusive basis. There 
was simultaneous recognition that the state was 
the only real tool they had to drive their own 
accumulation interests. These both were com-
promised by the content of the negotiated set-
tlement.
The ideological pressures on the leadership to 
step back from retaining an overtly interven-
tionist agenda were significant. The growing 
consensus amongst global elites was that the 
state had to withdraw from active intervention 
in the economy as far as possible, to make space 
for the expansion and increased profitability of 
large-scale corporations. That fitted in fairly well 
with the interests of white monopoly capital in 
South Africa. In South Africa, the state also faced 
a fiscal crisis that had to be brought under con-
trol. From the 1970s, numerous processes were 
already under way to restructure the economy 
on these lines. The process of ‘elite pacting’ en-
couraged compromises that allowed a transfer 
of political power in exchange for economic con-
tinuity (Wood 2000). In agriculture, this continu-
ity was manifested through ongoing facilitation 
of the processes of deregulation and liberalisa-
tion. Generally, marketisation of sectors previ-
ously held by government monopoly gathered 
apace in, for example, telecommunications and 
broadcasting, roads, agriculture, (some) water 
supply, and housing. Private provision of edu-
cation, health and security captured those who 
could afford to pay, leaving the state to take 
responsibility for those who could not afford to 
pay. These constraints had a material impact on 
the potential for the liberation movement to use 
the state to carry forward a radical agenda. 
Unlike in South East Asia where the developmen-
tal state was very specifically linked to a concrete 
industrialisation strategy, in South Africa it was 
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capital, giving it a foot up in building itself in-
dependently, while using the state to favour Af-
rikaner capital (see O’Meara 1996). The gravita-
tional pull of state patronage drew a non-racial 
elite into the orbit of the ANC, generating and 
reinforcing exactly the social base sought by the 
‘1996 class project’. This is not unusual. The state 
has power and resources, and white capital has 
always oriented itself to the political power of 
the day. The result was a very particular form of 
the developmental state, which did not so much 
align economic activity with political priorities 
as redistribute public resources to build an eco-
nomic-political elite.
Black economic 
empowerment, parastatals 
and building a class base
The party-state under the hegemony of the nas-
cent black bourgeoisie is in favour of using the 
state apparatus to advance its own class inter-
ests, and to attempt to align the interests of the 
dominant social forces in the historic bloc that 
it leads with these interests. This translates into 
an argument and a strategy – which is currently 
hegemonic in South Africa – that deracialising 
the capitalist economy and securing basic rights 
within that economy for workers is the most vi-
able path forward at present. Assuming political 
power and thereby taking over the apparatus of 
the state, however, confronts both the residual 
power of the old hegemony (the way the state is 
structured to serve a particular ideology) as well 
as the entrenched power of the bureaucracy. The 
‘sunset clauses’ agreed upon during the negoti-
ated settlement gave these conservative forces a 
further lease on life. While the state is a centre 
of power and has significant material force, it 
must be understood as a contradictory and disu-
nited ensemble of overlapping relationships of 
power. The bureaucracy does not simply trans-
mit the state’s power as a frictionless pipe, but 
modifies and transforms it in the process of ma-
terialising the state (Allen 1999). Officials bring 
their own power into the relationship, translat-
ing and manipulating rules and procedures for 
their own ends (Lipsky 1981). The bureaucracy is 
a critical actor in the realisation of the idea of 
the state and in its practices alike.
A BEE framework for agriculture (AgriBEE) 
was released in 2004, and a Sector Charter was 
gazetted in 2008, to increase the involvement 
of black businesses in agriculture throughout 
the commodity chain. As with other sectors of 
the economy, the aim was to encourage greater 
black ownership and control of existing and new 
agricultural businesses, and to ensure that black 
people are involved in executive and senior man-
agement positions in agricultural businesses. The 
Charter identifies seven areas of empowerment: 
ownership; management control; employment 
equity; skills development; preferential procure-
ment; enterprise development; and rural devel-
opment, poverty alleviation and corporate social 
investment (NDA 2006a). The AgriBEE scorecard 
establishes a number of specific targets, for ex-
ample 25% of equity ownership, 40% participa-
tion in senior top management, 2% of the levi-
able amount to be spent on skills development, 
and 1.5% to be spent on corporate social invest-
ment (NDA 2006b). Changes in racial patterns of 
ownership are important, and the Charter estab-
lishes a framework for how this can happen. The 
primary incentive for private companies abiding 
by the AgriBEE Charter is preferential procure-
ment, with the state using its power as a pur-
chaser of goods and services to promote BEE. 
However, since most economic activity happens 
outside the state, the implementation of BEE re-
mains voluntary to a large extent. If a company 
does not want to change, it is not forced to. Over 
time, it will just become a bit more difficult to do 
business, mainly with the state.
The Charter took some time to set up, and it is 
too early to see what impact it is having. A sur-
vey conducted by the ABC and the IDC showed 
that amongst responding ABC members, 8% had 
no BEE strategy in place in 2007, 46% were busy 
constructing one and 46% were implementing 
a BEE strategy (IDC 2007).19 In a survey on the 
dairy industry in the Western and Eastern Cape, 
only 6% of firms had a BEE strategy in place in 
2008 (Business Report 2008). The responding 
agribusinesses have focused their efforts on the 
socio-economic and skills development aspects 
of BEE. Similar results on priority areas were 
found in the dairy industry survey. According to 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, which conducted the 
research, ‘generally, there is a reluctance to pri-
oritise ownership, with most participants want-
ing to avoid ownership changes at this stage’. 
In the IDC survey, larger companies prioritised 
ownership, management control and employ-
ment equity, while smaller companies prioritised 
employment equity and socio-economic devel-
opment. In restructuring ownership, external 
BEE partners and workers’ trusts were the most 
19 Response was voluntary; 
consequently, the results will 
be skewed towards those in 
favour of BEE.
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channelled public resources into implementing 
government plans for the benefit of many. As 
such, they were oriented towards building the 
capitalist class rather than assisting workers and 
the poor. By and large, they have accommo-
dated the market and have proven to be insti-
tutional bases for the building of a narrow capi-
talist clique that does not generate its wealth 
through its own productive activity. The various 
development corporations that have emerged 
in the post-apartheid period need to be under-
stood in a contested framework. There are vastly 
different views on what provincial development 
corporations might be useful for. They might be 
seen, and used, as channels for funnelling public 
resources into private hands (see, for example, 
Sapa 2008 on the Eastern Cape Development 
Corporation, Letsoalo & Arenstein 2005 on the 
Mpumalanga Economic Empowerment Corpora-
tion, and Nair 2009 on the AgriBEE Fund), but 
they also might be seen as necessary vehicles for 
driving a pro-poor agenda. For example, the left 
in the alliance aims to ‘roll back and disrupt the 
intersection between the holding of public of-
fice and business interests’ and to ‘expose and 
defeat the corporatisation of the state and the 
movement’ (Nzimande 2009). Whether this is 
more than merely rhetoric remains to be seen.
The backlash against ‘narrow-based’ BEE and 
the abuse of parastatals for personal (and class) 
gain was part of a much wider movement in op-
position to the trajectory adopted by the ANC 
under Thabo Mbeki, from outside the alliance 
as well as inside it. Open contestation rose from 
the start of the 2000s, and gathered pace after 
the ANC’s watershed 2005 National General 
Council and then the 2007 Polokwane National 
Conference, when an alternative agenda for the 
developmental state was articulated inside the 
ruling alliance. This agenda places emphasis on 
interventions by the state that redirect resources 
to the poor, including rolling back the market 
and disciplining, regulating and expropriating 
capital to advance democratic, developmental 
agendas. State interventions include nationali-
sation, expropriation of land, and the creation 
of a comprehensive social wage (COSATU 2009). 
While the leftist strand is vocal at present, it is 
by no means certain that it will be able to secure 
hegemony. The alliance of forces that brought 
Jacob Zuma to power is highly contradictory. 
The struggle between the ‘Mbeki-ites’ and the 
‘Zuma-ites’ is an internal battle between factions 
of the middle and capitalist classes (mainly black, 
but increasingly deracialised). In their interven-
frequently employed options. The bulk of fund-
ing for BEE deals came from the company itself, 
from black partners, or from development fi-
nance institutions. 
By the time the AgriBEE Charter was set up, the 
concept of BEE had become ‘broad based’. This 
was a reaction to the narrow BEE that saw huge 
deals made between political heavyweights and 
monopoly capital, which benefited a small elite 
group and advanced the political-corporate pact 
at the top of the power structure in society (see, 
for example, Davie 2005). In the most blatant 
cases, state managers prepared the ground for 
privatisation and then left the public service to 
take material advantage of that privatisation. 
The Charter includes elements of ‘economic 
empowerment’ for workers and the rural poor. 
The Charter is open for this to take the form 
of skills development and welfarist, corporate-
social-investment  projects, which are functional 
to capitalism. At the same time, there is room 
for management and business elites to acquire 
ownership and control in businesses, on a busi-
ness basis. Some of the BEE deals that took place 
in agriculture were the R323 million transfer of 
Boschendal wine estate, Phetego Investments’ 
25.1% acquisition in KWV, the sale of a 15% 
stake in Distell’s South African Distilleries and 
Wines to a BEE consortium, the R502 million sale 
of a 26.77% stake in Afgri Operations to the Agri 
Sizwe Empowerment Trust (which was opposed 
by FAWU for its unequal distribution of bene-
fits), a contract farming scheme with Rainbow 
Chickens, Country Foods’ sale of 4% of shares to 
Kagiso Trust for R5.5 million, and the acquisition 
of a 30% stake in exporter Afrifresh Group by 
Vuwa Investments (headed by Bulelani Ngcuka). 
Undoubtedly, the Charter is situated within a 
capitalist framework that seeks to change own-
ership along the value chain but does not chal-
lenge its structure.
Agricultural parastatals are also wielded in the 
interests of classes. Many of the homeland ag-
ricultural development corporations and other 
parastatals (e.g. the ACB and the marketing 
boards) were shut down during the process of 
liberalisation and deregulation of agriculture. 
Others were corporatised and formed the model 
for the growth of a new set of market-friendly 
development corporations and agencies, in par-
ticular at provincial level. These corporations and 
agencies operated more as commercially orient-
ed financing and business support institutions 
in the mode of the IDC than as agencies that 
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tions, COSATU and the SACP have brought ele-
ments of a third, working class, option into play, 
while simultaneously strengthening the hand of 
the ‘Zuma-ite’ faction of the middle and capital-
ist classes. Of necessity, strengthening the work-
ing class strand requires a broadening out of its 
base and a transcendence of the current alli-
ance. A new project will need to take leadership 
of society from the middle and capitalist classes. 
In order to do this, such a project needs to incor-
porate the interests of other social forces into 
its agenda so as to develop and lead a counter-
hegemonic cross-class alliance.
Lest we are tempted to take at face value this 
struggle between the ‘new capitalists’ and the 
‘communists’ inside the alliance, we should rec-
ognise that the ‘Zuma-ite’ and ‘worker’ factions 
were allied in their support for Jacob Zuma in 
the period after 2005. Concerns about the ideo-
logical orientation of the left within the alliance 
have been raised in this regard. In essence, the 
critique is that a ‘neo-Stalinist populist’ faction 
has taken control of the SACP and through the 
particular association it has forged with ele-
ments of the middle and capitalist classes, is like-
ly to support another wave of state-led capitalist 
modernisation rather than stimulating and pro-
viding leadership for the revival of a mass-based 
project of transformation (Satgar 2009; Jara 
2005). The essence of the political trajectory is 
state-centric and can be driven only by the state, 
with the citizenry as a junior partner.
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9 Conclusion: pursuing a 
smallholder strategy
By the end of apartheid, a nascent differentia-
tion had emerged between a class of black farm-
ers who received some state support through 
‘master farmer’ and bantustan development 
corporation group schemes, and the majority of 
producers (chiefly in the former bantustans and 
on commercial farms) who received almost no 
support at all. There are an estimated 240 000 
black farmers with a commercial focus and be-
tween 2 million and 4 million farmers who pro-
duce food mainly to meet their own household 
consumption needs (Jacobs et al. 2008). These 
groups form the natural base for a smallholder 
strategy. The vast majority are under-resourced, 
mainly subsistence producers in the former 
homelands. More than three-quarters of the 
farmers in the former homelands are women 
(Stats SA & NDA 2001). In the late 1990s, just 6% 
of households in the former homelands with ac-
cess to farming land actually sold anything they 
produced (Stats SA 1997).
During the transition to democracy, there was 
some policy debate on the relative merits and 
demerits of pursuing a smallholder strategy. The 
Land and Agricultural Policy Centre (a policy 
think-tank set up by the ANC to develop ideas 
about how restructuring of agriculture could 
benefit the dispossessed majority) and the World 
Bank were two particularly influential voices at 
the time. There was general agreement amongst 
insiders that it was necessary to continue with 
the policy reforms started under apartheid to 
wean commercial agriculture off state support, 
and for markets to drive the sector in future. 
There was acknowledgement that black farm-
ers would not immediately be functioning on 
the scale of white farmers; hence, the discussion 
about how smallholder black farmers could be 
integrated into a restructuring agricultural sys-
tem (see, for example, Lipton, De Klerk & Lipton 
1996). The possibility of using existing state in-
stitutions (even in altered form) to facilitate the 
expansion and diversification of the producer 
base into the black population in a meaningful 
way was rejected (see Bayley 2000). The archi-
tects of the policy succeeded in convincing the 
politicians that the restructuring of commercial 
agriculture would be able to accommodate black 
farmers using the market as a key mechanism for 
provision of services and infrastructure.
The smallholder component of the resulting 
strategy was not implemented in any meaning-
ful way. The ANC’s initial policy was based on 
the premise of state support, but this was not 
forthcoming. Aside from its urban orientation, 
the government as a whole faced a fiscal crisis 
inherited from apartheid, and the national agri-
cultural budget dropped both in nominal and in 
real terms throughout the 1990s. Input support 
to the three categories of farmers that could 
form the basis for a smallholder strategy was not 
prioritised in the government’s overall economic 
policy trajectory.
Rhetorically, a renewed emphasis is being placed 
on a smallholder strategy. The ANC’s National 
Conference resolutions at Polokwane in 2007 
call for ‘a modern and competitive smallholder 
sector’. The resolutions commit the ANC to im-
plementing ‘large-scale programmes to estab-
lish new smallholders and to improve the pro-
ductivity of existing small-scale and subsistence 
farmers’. The ANC also resolved to build public 
and private institutions that can provide finan-
cial support, research and extension, tools and 
equipment, and which can facilitate market ac-
cess and co-operation. A note of warning must 
be sounded against focusing exclusively on small-
holders/family farms, which could underplay the 
possibility of other, collective, forms of tenure 
for production (Pienaar 2009). This is linked to 
the notion of private, individual ownership of 
land that forcefully emerged in policy with LRAD 
in 2001. Other tenure options need to be kept 
open so that family farms do not become the 
next ‘one-size-fits-all’ (Pienaar 2009).
There is insufficient financial support for the ag-
ricultural sector as a whole, which means that 
agricultural plans cannot be carried out. The 
government should restrain itself from design-
ing plans that it is unable to implement because 
of lack of resources. It is better to be honest 
about what can be achieved than to make grand 
promises that cannot be met. The response of 
the national government in a time of economic 
contraction like the present has been to pull 
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resources out of agriculture and into other pri-
ority areas of the economy. Whether this is the 
correct decision or not, it indicates that, despite 
the rhetoric of rural development accompanying 
the Zuma administration’s rise to power, when it 
comes to the crunch, agriculture and rural devel-
opment are not really seen as potential drivers of 
the economy. We remain in the broad mindset 
that agriculture is a declining sector compared 
to the whole economy, and that the future is 
urban. If more resources are to come into the 
sector, it is imperative that emphasis is placed 
on building capacity in provincial departments 
to deliver, with more skilled, and decentralised, 
staff as the primary concern. Even if this takes a 
few years to get right, it will lay the platform for 
far more meaningful delivery in future.
Shifting from a racially exclusive agricultural 
system to a more racially inclusive one will take 
time. Patience is required. If we look at the his-
tory of the creation of white commercial agri-
culture in South Africa, the pace was extremely 
slow, and significant, ongoing state support was 
essential. After the land was acquired (through 
dispossession at that time) settlers took years, 
even decades, merely to settle permanently 
on the land. They did not know how to farm, 
and the state sponsored waves of debt forgive-
ness, capital write-off and infrastructural devel-
opment to ensure they remained on the land. 
Gradually, markets began to develop, differen-
tiation occurred between the settlers, and some 
were able to become profitable (an example 
of this process in Limpopo can be found in Mu-
laudzi 2000; see also Beinart, Delius & Trapido 
1986). In the meantime, the government had 
pumped resources into creating co-operative in-
frastructure, expanding the public infrastructure 
like railways, roads and dams, employing policy 
systems that gave farmers a real voice in govern-
ment, and generally recognising that to build 
an agricultural sector required government ex-
penditure on which there would be no direct, 
immediate, monetary returns. South Africa 
is now in the initial stages of building a black 
farming class, and many lessons can be drawn 
from the way the state intervened in the past. 
However, we want to go a step further than 
merely reproducing the commercial agricultural 
model on a wider basis. The challenge is to think 
about which of the state-sponsored institutions 
and interventions of the past can contribute to 
building a more equitable agricultural model in 
the present, which does not rely (as the earlier 
model did) on dispossession, super-exploitation 
of the workforce, and ecological damage.
What kind of agriculture does current policy en-
courage? The strategic priorities have been list-
ed as: enhancing equitable access and participa-
tion in the agricultural sector; improving global 
competitiveness and profitability; and ensuring 
sustainable resource management (NDA 2001). 
These could be restated as social, economic and 
environmental sustainability within the context 
of a capitalist economy. If we take these one by 
one, several questions arise. Enhancing access 
and participation is a key goal, but how is this to 
be achieved? As we see in the policies and prac-
tices above, the primary way of realising this is 
to secure the existing agricultural structure and 
economy and then to reform it at the edges to 
create room for others. Social justice, however, 
requires more thoroughgoing transformation 
than merely accommodating more people in 
the existing way of doing things. It is clear that 
the present agricultural model is unsustainable, 
socially, ecologically and (increasingly) economi-
cally. Access to the agricultural economy has to 
go hand in hand with transforming that econ-
omy to internalise costs currently borne by the 
workforce and the environment. Since this is un-
feasible within the existing logic, the logic must 
change.
Sustainable resource management is also critical. 
But how is this anticipated to happen in the con-
text of striving for global competitiveness and 
profitability? To what extent will this secure the 
food needs of those living in the territory of the 
South African government’s jurisdiction, and be-
yond, into the region? A political decision needs 
to be made. Is it worth spending public resources 
(without getting a profitable return on invest-
ment) on building and sustaining an agricultural 
sector that can engage a far wider layer of peo-
ple in diverse scales and models of production, 
or is it more important to only allow those parts 
of the agricultural sector that can weather the 
vagaries and inbuilt inequalities of the global 
agro-food system to survive, and use public re-
sources to support some other, potentially more 
profitable arm of economic activity? There is not 
necessarily a right or a wrong answer here. It in-
volves a weighing up of many factors. So far, the 
debate has tended to focus almost exclusively on 
the return on government investment in a nar-
row sense, rather than looking at the employ-
ment and local economic multiplier effects of 
support to agricultural production, even where 
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the government does not ‘get its money back’ in 
a direct, dividends sense.
We must acknowledge that in the current set-up 
there is resource scarcity; and, rhetoric aside, it 
is unlikely that the agricultural budget will rise 
significantly in real terms. Therefore, we need 
to think out of the box. A critical weakness in 
the current policy and approach is the failure 
to connect with a mobilised mass base to real-
ise land reform and ecologically sustainable ag-
ricultural production. Independent CSOs make 
a mistake if they think that their strength will 
come from government acceptance alone, just 
as the government is mistaken to think that it 
can manufacture a civil society according to its 
own needs. The strength of CSOs derives from 
their capacity to mobilise masses of people with 
a common agenda of change, regardless of the 
party-state’s political orientation towards them. 
The abiding strength of a government is trust in 
the integrity of the population and investment 
in popular energy without trying to control that 
energy for its own ends.
A smallholder path for agriculture in South Af-
rica is a new path. The foundations are there in 
the everyday practices of millions of food pro-
ducers at varying scales, from the occasional 
backyard producer to the commercial farmer 
on 100 hectares, all of whom can be consid-
ered smallholders. The country is currently reli-
ant on large-scale commercial agriculture for 
food security. That, in itself, is a useful base, but 
needs to be transformed. A strategy that seeks 
to insert smallholders into the large-scale, in-
dustrial, export-oriented model can succeed in 
broadening and diversifying the producer base 
only slightly. The large-scale model also brings 
with it the deepening problems of concentra-
tion in the value chain, which, in turn, entrench 
the production model. The ANC in government 
has identified the major contours of the chal-
lenge, but its responses tend towards seeking 
to deracialise that model while keeping its core 
intact. An alternative has to confront the exist-
ing economic power of commercial agriculture 
and agro-industry with the aim of transforming 
it. Deracialisation is necessary but not sufficient 
to realise this. The logic of a smallholder strat-
egy must be followed beyond the farm gate, 
to the institutions that support agriculture, and 
the value chains that feed off it. Deconcentra-
tion, decentralisation of value-adding activities, 
the stimulation of local markets, and the scaling 
down of individual interventions and casting the 
net wider, based on the initiative and activities 
of the producers themselves, are all part of this.
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